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UNDERSTANDING MASS PERSONAL INJURY
LITIGATION: A SOCIO-LEGAL ANALYSIS
Deborah R. Hensler*
Mark A. Peterson**
INTRODUCTION
The 1980s marked the era of mass personal injury litiga-
tion. Hundreds of thousands of people sued scores of corpora-
tions for losses due to injuries or diseases that they attributed
to catastrophic events, pharmaceutical products, medical devic-
es or toxic substances (see Figure 1).' In some parts of the
country, mass tort claims threatened to overwhelm the civil
justice system, accounting for more than one-quarter of the
entire civil caseload in certain courts.2 As a result of this wave
of litigation, some businesses found that products once regard-
ed as significant marketing successes now had the potential to
drive them into bankruptcy. The specter of mass liability
frightened insurers from some markets, and manufacturers
from research and development in some product lines.3
* Senior Social Scientist and Director, RAND Institute for Civil Justice, and
Professor of Social Science in Law, University of Southern California Law Center.
"" Senior Social Scientist, RAND Institute for Civil Justice. An earlier version
of this Article was presented at the Symposium on Reinventing Civil Litigation:
Evaluating Proposals for Change, at Brooklyn Law School, May 1993, and at
faculty workshops at the UCLA Law School and University of Southern California
Law Center. Financial support for the project was provided by the Carnegie
Commission on Science and Technology and by the RAND Institute for Civil
Justice. Ingrid Causey assisted in preparing the case profiles.
1 Hereinafter all references to "Figure 1" or "Figure 2," whether in text or
footnotes, refer to diagrams appearing at the end of this Article.
2 See DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE
OF MASS TOXIC TORTS 25-27 (1985) [hereinafter HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE
COURTS]; Deborah Hensler, Fashioning A National Resolution of Asbestos Personal
Injury Litigation: A Reply to Professor Brickman, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1967, 1992
(1992) [hereinafter Hensler, Fashioning a Resolution]. By 1990, asbestos litigation
accounted for three-quarters of all new federal product liability filings. See
Deborah Hensler, Reading the Tort Litigation Tea Leaves: What's Going On In the
Civil Liability System? 16 JUST. SYS. J. 137, 147 (1993) [hereinafter Hensler,
Reading the Tort Litigation Tea Leaves].
3 STEVEN GARBER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE ECONOMICS OF PHARMA-
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The mass litigation of the 1980s involved enormous stakes.
Hundreds of thousands of plaintiffs received compensation for
their injuries. Businesses and their insurers paid billions of
dollars in indemnification. Plaintiffs', defense, and insurance
lawyers received billions of dollars more.4 As a result of mass
personal injury litigation, trusts that were established to pay
asbestos claimants now effectively own the Manville Corpora-
tion and several other major asbestos manufacturers.' Similar-
ly, as a consequence of their mass litigation, the Dalkon Shield
Claimants Trust received over seventy-five percent of the pro-
ceeds of the sale, in bankruptcy, of A.H. Robins, Co., the manu-
facturer of the Shield.6 Asbestos and other mass tort claimants
soon may own a dozen other businesses that are in or face
possible bankruptcy.'
Although there is disagreement about the causes and legit-
imacy of this litigation,8 almost all of those involved would
agree that the civil justice system has not performed well in
CEUTICALS AND MEDICAL DEVICES (1993).
" By 1982, a total of one billion dollars had been paid in compensation and
transaction costs for asbestos worker injury litigation. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET
AL., VARIATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES (1984). In
1991, the total value of all pending asbestos worker injury claims was estimated
at between $8 billion and $14 billion, not including legal fees. In re Joint E. & S.
Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 931 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991). According to most
estimates, for each dollar spent on indemnification of asbestos injury claims, more
than two dollars are spent on legal fees and other transaction costs. See Hensler,
Fashioning a Resolution, supra note 2, at 1977.
' Trusts established to pay asbestos claimants were given the majority of
stock in Manville, UNR Industries, and a major subsidiary of National Gypsum.
Eagle-Picher, Inc. and the asbestos claimants have agreed to support a bankruptcy
reorganization plan in which a claimants' trust would own all stock of that compa-
ny. See Marianna S. Smith, Resolving Asbestos Claims: The Manville Personal
Injury Settlement Trust, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 30 (1990). On the devel-
opment of claims facilities operated by trusts as a mechanism for compensating
mass tort claimants, see Mark A. Peterson, Giving Away Money: Comparative
Comments on Claims Resolution Facilities, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 113 (1990).
6 Over $2.3 billion dollars was placed in a trust to pay Dalkon Shield claim-
ants by American Home Products, which bought A.H. Robins. See Kenneth R.
Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79,
103-04 (1990).
Hensler, Fashioning a Resolution, supra note 2, at 1972.
For an example of the diverse perspectives on the causes of mass tort liti-
gation, see Colloquy: An Administrative Alternative to Tort Litigation to Resolve
Asbestos Claims, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1817 (1992) (presenting views of judges,
plaintiffs' and defense attorneys, a labor union leader and scholars on asbestos
litigation).
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response to the challenge of mass torts. The litany of criticisms
is long and familiar: cases take an inordinately long time to
reach disposition, sometimes concluding long after a plaintiffs
death; outcomes are highly variable, often seeming to have
little relationship to plaintiffs' injuries or defendants' culpabili-
ty; transaction costs are excessive, far outstripping the
amounts paid out in compensation. 9
Why the civil justice system has had such problems re-
sponding to mass personal injury litigation is itself a matter of
some controversy. Some attribute these problems to a lack of
fit between traditional civil procedure, with its reliance on
individualized case treatment, and the demands imposed on
courts by massive numbers of claims which, in practice, cannot
be treated individually.' This view has led to myriad propos-
als to facilitate aggregative treatment of mass tort claims, by
amending Rule 23;" extending multidistricting to include trial
as well as pretrial preparation and state as well as federal
cases;" encouraging informal coordination between state and
federal courts; 3 creating a new "national disaster court," 4 or
removing some or all mass torts from the court system entire-
ly.15
' See, e.g., HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS, supra note 2; JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE AD Hoc COMMITEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION, REPORT OF THE AD
Hoc COMMITTEE (1991).
1" For discussions of the issue of "fit," see Deborah Hensler, Resolving Mass
Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89 and PETER SCHUCK,
AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1986).
n JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COMMITIEE ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, ADVISORY COMMIMITrEE ON CIVIL RULES, PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO RULE 23 (Feb. 4, 1993).
2 For example, in 1991, the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States
House of Representatives recommended for action by the full House the Multipar-
ty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1991, which would have created federal court
jurisdiction for litigation involving 25 persons or more, arising out of mass acci-
dents and other disasters. See H.R. REP. No. 373, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
More recently, the American Law Institute ("ALI") Complex Litigation Project rec-
ommended expanding the scope of multidistricting by explicitly providing for trial,
as well as pretrial preparation, within the multidistrict context and
multidistricting across state jurisdictions. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX
LITIGATION PROJECT (Proposed Final Draft, Apr. 5, 1993).
3 William W Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism in Action: Coordination of
Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689 (1992).
1, Ralph I. Lancaster & Catherine R. Connors, Creation of a National Disaster
Court: A Response to "Judicial Federalism in Action," 78 VA. L. REv. 1753 (1992).
1 See, e.g., Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Claims Management Act of 1991: A
1993]
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At present, mass torts seem to have become a fixture on
the litigation landscape. The specialized mass tort plaintiffs'
bar that emerged during the 1980s has accumulated capital as
a result of its success in litigating earlier mass claims, and is
skillful and aggressive in identifying new investment opportu-
nities. A mass tort defense bar has developed to counter these
plaintiffs' attorney efforts. An elite of trial judges has come
forward, ready to set aside traditional case-at-a-time disposi-
tion procedures in favor of aggregative procedures for disposing
of hundreds or even thousands of cases. 6 A cottage industry of
experts and special masters supports their efforts by designing
complex procedures and crafting complex settlements." Appel-
late courts wrestle with collective disposition of mass claims.
Lawyers, judges, and business executives no longer wonder
whether or not there will be another mass tort, but rather
what the next mass tort will be.
What distinguishes mass personal injury torts from ordi-
nary high volume civil litigation? What explains the emergence
of this litigation in the 1980s? Why are mass personal injury
torts so difficult to resolve? Can we devise methods for dealing
with this litigation more equitably and more efficiently?
This article offers some answers to these questions. The
analysis is based on structured conversations with some of the
leading participants in recent mass personal injury litigations,
an examination of the rich journalistic and scholarly literature
on this litigation, our own previous research on asbestos and
other mass torts and one of the author's experiences as an
expert in mass tort litigation. The Article presents a way of
thinking about the emergence and growth of mass torts, rather
Proposal to the United States Congress, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1891 (1992).
" See Mark A. Peterson & Molly Selvin, Mass Justice: The Limited and Unlim-
ited Power of Courts, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 227 (1991); Judith Resnik,
From "Cases" to "Litigation", 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991). Reflecting the
special treatment courts accord mass claims, at least one trial court (the Phila-
delphia Court of Common Pleas) has formally established a "mass torts" calendar,
administered by a special cadre of judges operating out of a specially equipped
facility.
17 One of the most prominent of these mass tort masters, Professor Francis
McGovern, has written widely about his experiences. See, e.g., The Alabama DDT
Settlement Fund, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61 (1990); Resolving Mature Mass
Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659 (1989); Toward a Functional Approach for
Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. CIu. L. REV. 440 (1986).
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than a conclusive analysis of the phenomenon. With a better
understanding of the dynamics of mass tort litigation, legisla-
tors can assess more realistically the consequences of proposed
procedural reforms for future mass litigation, and courts can
better understand how their actions may determine the growth
or decline of mass tort cases and their outcomes.
We begin in Part I by defining mass torts, identifying the
key factors that distinguish this litigation from other personal
injury litigation involving large numbers of plaintiffs and
claims. For those who are not already familiar with the facts of
the major mass torts of the 1980s, Part II presents brief case
histories of that litigation. Part III then identifies the social
and legal factors that contributed to the emergence of mass
personal injury litigation in the 1980s. Part IV next discusses
the features of mass tort litigation that make it difficult to
resolve efficiently and equitably. Finally, Part V reviews recent
proposals to improve the management of mass torts, and sug-
gests why they may fall short of the mark.
I. WHAT DISTINGUISHES MASS TORTS FROM ORDINARY HIGH
VOLUME LITIGATION?
Three factors distinguish mass torts from ordinary person-
al injury litigation: the large number of claims associated with
a single "litigation;""8 the commonality of issues and actors
among claims within a litigation; and the interdependence of
claim values. Numerosity is the primary defining characteristic
of a mass tort litigation. The best known examples of mass
litigation, such as asbestos workers' personal injury suits and
the Dalkon Shield bankruptcy litigation, have involved hun-
dreds of thousands of cases; the most recent examples of mass
torts involve at least a thousand individual claims (see Figure
1). The high visibility of mass torts and the burdens they im-
pose on courts and parties are direct consequences of the large
numbers of claims in each litigation.
But numerosity, by itself, is not sufficient to distinguish
mass tort litigation from ordinary tort litigation. The court
system routinely disposes of half a million or so automobile
" Judith Resnik has noted the shift in our paradigm for considering civil case
processing, from individual cases to "litigation." See Resnik, supra note 16, at 5.
19931
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accident cases per year, far more than the number involved in
any single mas tort. 9 Mass torts are distinguished from auto-
mobile accident litigation and other ordinary, high-volume
litigation by the commonality of issues and actors among indi-
vidual mass tort claims. Mass torts involve a common set of
injuries which are incurred in the same or similar circumstanc-
es. Most plaintiffs are represented by a relatively small num-
ber of law firms, each of which may represent hundreds or
thousands of claimants. Claims are brought against one or a
few defendants, and a relatively small number of law firms
defend or at least control the defense of thousands of claims. In
addition, mass tort litigation is usually concentrated in a few
jurisdictions, either as a result of the circumstances of injury
or as a result of court action.
For example, almost all asbestos personal injury cases
involve claims of either respiratory or gastro-intestinal cancers
or other respiratory injuries incurred in the course of handling
asbestos in shipyards or maritime industries, petrochemical
factories or other workplaces. Each asbestos case typically
names about twenty of the same thirty to forty asbestos manu-
facturers and distributors as defendants. Most of the hundreds
of thousands of claimants are represented by fewer than fifty
plaintiffs' law firms that specialize in this litigation, and their
law suits are concentrated in a dozen courts." Similarly, most
Dalkon Shield claimants alleged a few types of gynecological
injuries due to pelvic inflammatory disease ("PID"), all attrib-
uted to a particular intrauterine device, which was manufac-
tured by a single company, A.H. Robins Co. The majority of
Dalkon Shield claimants were represented by thirty firms, and
suits were concentrated in a few states, notably Minnesota,
Maryland and California.
Because of their high degree of commonality, similar factu-
al issues and legal questions will arise in all claims in a mass
tort litigation, or at least in significant subsets of claims. The
same injuries will involve similar causation issues. Liability
issues will be similar among claims alleging similar exposures
to a particular defendant's products. Because of the common
19 JAMES S. KAKAu & NICHOLAS PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN
TORT LITIGATION 14 (1986).
2 See generally Hensler, Fashioning a Resolution, supra note 2.
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legal representation within each side, even the litigation strat-
egies will be similar among large groups of claims.
The contrast with ordinary tort litigation is sharp. In ordi-
nary automobile accident litigation, claimants allege a vast
array of disparate injuries to different parts of the
body-ranging from soft tissue injuries to fractures to paraple-
gia-incurred under diverse circumstances. Causation, liability
and damages issues differ from case to case. Most cases have
one or, perhaps, two defendants, and there are as many or
more different defendants involved in automobile litigation as
there are cases. Tens of thousands of law firms represent auto-
mobile injury victims, whose claims are spread among every
state court in the country.
Courts' attempts to manage mass torts efficiently often
further increase the commonality among mass tort claims.
Courts typically assign mass torts to one or a few judges for
pretrial purposes, either through formal mechanisms, such as
the federal multi-district litigation procedure, or through infor-
mal court assignment practices.2' As a result, a small number
of judges may be responsible for critical decisions which affect
hundreds or thousands of cases, adding another common factor
to the litigation.2
This commonality produces the third defining characteris-
tic of mass tort litigation: the monetary values of mass tort
claims are highly interdependent. In mass litigation, the likely
amount that one plaintiff will receive for a claim depends upon
the values of other claims. Indeed, the claims are so similar
that the prospective value of many claims will rise or fall
sharply with a large plaintiff award, a defense verdict or even
a signal discovery event or evidentiary decision in a single case
that is part of the mass of pending claims.
21 HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS, supra note 2, at 78-80.
1 For example, as a result of the decision by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation to transfer asbestos cases to the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, Judge Charles Wiener is now responsible for more than 30,000 of these
cases. See In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L.
1991). Judge Robert Mehrige of the Eastern District of Virginia presided over the
A.H. Robins bankruptcy proceeding, which set the parameters for resolving some
195,000 Dalkon Shield Claims. See RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW (1991).
As a result of multidistricting and class action certification, Judge Jack B.
Weinstein oversaw the settlement of more than 250,000 Agent Orange Claims. See
SCHUCK, supra note 10.
1993]
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Of course, the values of all tort claims are interdependent
to some extent. In many large metropolitan trial court jurisdic-
tions, personal injury attorneys regularly consult reports of
recently tried cases to determine the "going rate" for particular
types of injuries. But the determination of causation and liabil-
ity in an ordinary tort claim is not dependent on outcomes of
other claims: whether a particular driver was liable for a par-
ticular accident usually has nothing to do with the liability of
another driver in a different accident. Although trends in aver-
age jury awards do influence settlement values of ordinary
claims over time, the prospective value of ordinary claims does
not rise or fall dramatically as the result of a single verdict on
a similar claim.
The interdependence of values in mass tort claims is far
more striking. No claim in a mass tort litigation will have
value until plaintiffs are able to establish causation, liability
and damages for at least a few representative claims. For ex-
ample, asbestos claims became viable only after the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Products held that asbestos manufacturers
could be held strictly liable for workers' injuries.23 Moreover, a
large award in one case increases the value of other, similar
mass tort claims. Following a $7.3 million San Francisco jury
award to a plaintiff claiming injuries from silicone breast im-
plants,' every breast implant claim pending nationwide be-
came much more valuable. Conversely the adverse disposition
of some mass tort claims can sharply reduce the values of all
other claims. For example, when jurors delivered a defense
verdict in a consolidated trial of about 1000 Bendectin cases,
thousands of Bendectin claims that were not directly involved
in the trial lost their value. Similarly, the several hundred
pending claims for cigarette-related lung cancer still have little
value because plaintiffs have not been able to win and sustain
a significant verdict in any such case. 6
493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
24 See, e.g., Alison Frankel, From Pioneers to Profits, AM. LAW., June 1992, at
82; Saundra Torry, The Race to Represent Breast-Implant Victims, WASH. POST,
Mar. 9, 1992, at F5.
25 In re Richardson-Merrell, "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212
(S.D. Oh. 1985).
2 The only significant award in a cigarette smoker case is Cipollone v. Liggett
[Vol. 59: 961
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Critical events other than trial outcomes also can greatly
change the value of all other claims in the same mass tort. For
example, the discovery of the "Sumner-Simpson" papers, indi-
cating knowledge among major defendants of asbestos' injuri-
ous effects, exposed these defendants to significant punitive
damages. This increased the value of all asbestos claims
against those defendants, not simply those claims directly
involved in the relevant discovery. Similarly, the Food and
Drug Administration's ("FDA") decision to prohibit silicone
breast implantation under most circumstances likely increased
the value of pending and future breast implantation claims
and encouraged a large number of new claims."
The enormous social and financial consequences of mass
torts derive from the combination of large numbers of claims
and interdependency of case values. In ordinary litigation a
major adverse outcome-a multi-million dollar plaintiff award
or a defendant victory in a high stakes case-may be a signifi-
cant blow to the parties. But such outcomes take on far greater
significance when they are multiplied many times over through
their impact on other mass claims. Numerosity and interde-
pendency create incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to seek out
potential mass tort claims, for defendants to invest enormous
sums in defending against these claims and for judges to de-
vise strategies to arrive at global resolution of mass claims. We
will consider these effects further in our discussion of the dy-
namics of mass tort litigation. But first we turn to a descrip-
tion of the mass tort litigations that provide the factual basis
for our analysis.
II. PROFILES OF MASS TORTS
Figure 1 lists the major mass personal injury claims that
have been filed in the United States from 1960 through
Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992), which was reversed on appeal and remanded
for retrial. See Gary T. Schwartz, Tobacco Liability in the Courts, in SMOKING
POLIcY: LAW, POLITIcS & CULTURE (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds.,
1993). The first case to reach verdict subsequent to Cipollone resulted in a defense
verdict.
' Karen Riley, Silicone Implants Given Limited OK, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 17,
1992, at C1. The FDA limited future implantations to breast cancer victims who
agree to participate in clinical trials.
1993]
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1992.28 In this section, we briefly describe each of these.
A. Mass Accident Cases
1. The Beverly Hills Supper Club Fire
On May 28, 1977, 162 people were killed and another 100
were injured in a fire at the Beverly Hills Supper Club, a
nightclub in Southgate, Kentucky." The fire was the second-
worst nightclub fire in United States history and resulted in
the first tort class action suit. ° After the fire, suits claiming
damages of $2.7 billion were filed in state and federal court
against 1100 defendants, represented by 225 law firms.3' The
principal defendants were the club owners, insurers and alumi-
num wire manufacturers.
District Judge Carl Rubin certified a class of injured plain-
tiffs and permitted separate trials for various groups of defen-
dants." The division of defendants encouraged settlement. In
1979, the club's owners settled for three million dollars.3 In
28 The litigation included in our analysis satisfies the definitional criteria of
numerosity, commonality and interdependence of case values. We reviewed a large
number of diverse cases, including all of the major mass toxic torts brought in the
last couple of decades, but we did not attempt to conduct a census of mass torts.
We did not include commercial airline litigation in our analysis because it general-
ly involves scores or hundreds of claims and the litigation generally lacks a high
degree of interdependence of case values. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., COSTS
AND COMPENSATION PAID IN AVIATION ACCmENTS (1988). Mass financial injury
cases, such as shareholder derivative suits, are also not included in our analysis,
which is limited to cases involving physical injury. Similarities between these two
classes of mass injury merit a separate analysis.
Most of the litigation we reviewed involved 1000 or more claims. Some early
litigation, such as the Beverly Hills Supper Club Fire litigation, involved fewer
cases, but is included because it helped lay the groundwork for future mass torts.
Although relatively few cases have been filed to date, some recent litigations, such
as lead exposure and electro-magnetic radiation ("EMR") cases, are included be-
cause there is a potential for massive litigation if these early cases result in plain-
tiff verdicts.
29 Peggy Lane, 159 Bodies Recovered in Club Fire, WASH. POST, May 30, 1977,
at Al.
2" Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977); see W. John More, 'Mas-
ter of Disaster" Builds Reputation for Mega-Settling, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 1, 1985, at
1.
31 High Court Paves Way for More Suits in Beverly Hills Fire, UPI: WASH.
NEWS, May 16, 1983, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
32 Id.
' Andrew Wolfson, After 8 years, a Complex Case Comes to an End, NAT'L
[Vol. 59: 961
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1980, after a jury found that the polychloride wiring insulation
in the club was not dangerous in itself, but that the manufac-
turers had a duty to warn about possible hazards when the
insulation was heated, the manufacturers of the wiring insula-
tion settled for $1.9 million.34 Soon afterward, Union Light,
Heat and Power Co., the local utility company that supplied
electricity to the club, settled for $5.75 million, and the Insur-
ance Services Organization, a consortium of more than 900
insurance carriers, settled for $4.7 million.35
By 1982, all of the cases in federal and state court had
been settled or dismissed, except for a class action suit against
electrical wiring companies.36 In 1980, a federal jury had deter-
mined that faulty aluminum wiring was not the cause of the
blaze, but the court of appeals overturned the verdict and or-
dered a new trial after a finding of juror misconduct. In
1985, a jury found that out-dated aluminum wiring was the
cause of the fire. Before the issue of liability reached the jury,
the wire manufacturers settled the case for fourteen million
dollars, and General Electric settled for ten million dollars."
L.J., Aug. 19, 1985, at 6.
" Jury in Supper Club Case Faults Insulation Makers, N.Y. TimES, Aug. 20,
1980, at A16.
" Wolfson, supra note 33. Uniroyal, the manufacturer of Naugahyde, settled
out of court for $800,000. The suit against the insurance companies was pursued
under a concert-of-action theory which alleged that the companies involved had
negligently failed to properly inspect the club.
" High Court Paves Way, supra note 31. The manufacturer of the chairs in the
club, Gasser, settled for $400,000. Luxaire, which had manufactured the rubber
latex used in the seats of the chairs paid $850,000 in settlement; other producers
of materials in the chairs paid $450,000. See Just One Defendant Left in Beverly
Hills Fire Trial, UPI, May 19, 1982, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File;
see also Wolfson, supra note 33. The class action suit against the electrical wiring
companies was pursued under the legal theory of enterprise liability as the plain-
tiffs did not know who had manufactured the wiring in the club. Enterprise liabili-
ty allows plaintiffs to pursue all members of an industry when the particular
manufacturer of a product cannot be identified. This was one of the first cases to
be pursued under an enterprise liability theory. The plaintiffs alleged that mem-
bers of the industry acted in concert to use old-technology aluminum wiring, which
they knew was dangerous.I High Court Paves Way, supra note 31. A juror wrote to a local newspaper
that he had conducted an experiment on the aluminum wiring and connection in
his home. The juror said that his test contradicted evidence presented at trial that
aluminum wiring was much more likely to overheat and cause fires than copper
wiring, and that screws holding aluminum wiring tend to loosen over the years.
He found nothing wrong with the aluminum wiring in his home. The juror had
communicated his findings to at least six other jurors.
38 UPI, July 18, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File; see also
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The settlements with the wire manufacturers brought the total
compensation fund for fire victims to fifty million dollars.3 9
2. The Hyatt Skywalk Collapse
On July 17, 1981, two skywalks in the lobby of the Hyatt
Regency Hotel in Kansas City collapsed on a dance floor crowd-
ed with about 1400 people. The hotel owner and developer was
Hallmark Cards, Inc. One hundred thirteen people were killed
and another 186 were injured.4' The National Bureau of Stan-
dards conducted an independent investigation of the collapse
and determined that the connection beams of the skywalks
were not designed to hold the weight of the thirty-five ton
skywalks.
41
Within one month, one hundred suits had been filed in
state court against twenty defendants, including Hallmark,
Hyatt Hotels, the building's architects, structural engineers
and contractors and the city of Kansas City. All cases were
assigned to Judge Timothy O'Leary, who effected a de facto
consolidation through coordinated discovery, and by appointing
a plaintiffs' management committee; he also persuaded
plaintiffs' lawyers to limit their fees to twenty-five percent.
Judge O'Leary further ordered that committee members would
be compensated only through their fee arrangements with
clients and not through fees for committee service. As a result
of this judicial order, the state litigation was controlled by local
lawyers, rather than "national" mass tort plaintiffs' lawyers.
Two nationally recognized class action experts then filed a
mandatory class action in the federal court, claiming that
defendants' exposure to punitive damages created a limited
fund. These lawyers, Irving Younger and Professor Arthur
Miller, were associated with Robert Gordon, a Kansas City
lawyer, who represented four clients with minor Skywalk inju-
ries. District Court Judge Scott 0. Wright certified the manda-
GE Loses Lawsuit in Fatal Club Fire, CH!. TRiB., July 16, 1985, at 4. General
Electric did not manufacture aluminum wiring but made devices that used it.
39 L-A. TIMES, July 19, 1985, at 2 (untitled news abstract).
" Lawsuits in Hyatt Tragedy Total at Least Eight, UPI, July 23, 1981, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
41 Warning Signs Ignored in Hyatt Skywalk Collapse, UPI, Oct. 3, 1982, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
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tory class in January 1982.42 State court plaintiffs and defen-
dants responded by joining in a mandamus petition to the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. That court struck the manda-
tory class action, ruling that it violated the Federal Anti-In-
junction Act,43 which limits federal courts' injunctions against
previously filed state court law suits." Noting that half of the
state suits had been settled prior to the federal class certifica-
tion, the Eighth Circuit found that the federal class action was
an intrusive interruption of individual litigation which had
been proceeding in the state courts.45
On remand, Judge Wright certified an opt-out, federal
class action. Soon after, Judge O'Leary certified plaintiffs'
motion for a state, opt-out class action that was coextensive
with the federal class. Both classes settled, and plaintiffs had
the option of participating in either or neither class settlement.
Plaintiffs in the federal class action received a total of $3.5
million for compensatory damages, plus a multiplier for puni-
tive damages. Under the state court settlement, defendants
agreed as to liability and plaintiffs retained the right to settle
or try the amount of their compensatory damages. In lieu of
punitive damages, defendants created a twenty million dollar
fund, which was added to compensatory damages.
The settlement of the state court class included an innova-
tive feature that has since become a staple of mass tort litiga-
tion-an offer to settle claims for small amounts quickly, based
on only minimal supporting information from plaintiffs." The
Skywalk defendants paid $1000 each to 1500 persons who
claimed to have been at the hotel at the time of the accident
and demonstrated some knowledge of the events of the acci-
42 In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
3 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1989).
In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982).
4' The filing of the federal class action apparently encouraged settlement of
state court cases as plaintiffs' lawyers sought to avoid inclusion in the federal
class. More than 100 cases settled between filing and certification. Interview with
Robert Sisk and John Townsend in New York (Jan. 19, 1989) (Notes on file with
the authors).
46 Expedited payment procedures have been included or proposed in bankruptcy
reorganization plans for A.H. Robins (Dalkon Shield claims), UNARCO, National
Gypsum Corporation, Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. and H. K. Porter Inc., and class
actions involving Fibreboard Industries and the Manville Personal Injury Settle-
ment Trust (each for asbestos claims). Over 100,000 Dalkon Shield claims and
most asbestos claims against UNR were settled through such expedited payments.
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dent.4" Most claimants opted out of the federal class, and ei-
ther accepted the $1000 payment or tried their claims for dam-
ages under the state class action.
Juries awarded substantial damages in the individual opt-
out cases: $4 million to a third-year law student crippled in the
collapse,4" and $15 million to a woman who became a quadri-
plegic as a result of the accident. 49 By 1986, Hallmark Cards,
Inc., had paid $120 million in settlements in individual and
class action cases, and all of the suits filed on behalf of the
dead and injured had been resolved.0
3. The MGM-Grand Hotel Fire
On the morning of November 21, 1980, faulty wiring in the
kitchen of the MGM-Grand Hotel in Las Vegas started one of
the worst hotel fires in history." Eighty-four people died, the
majority of them from smoke inhalation, and over 500 people
were injured.52
The hotel and several other defendants faced substantial
exposure for both compensatory and punitive damages. The
hotel had no smoke alarms; sprinklers were located only on the
casino level, in the money counting room, but not in the casino
itself.53 After the fire, safety specialists discovered significant
building and fire code violations that may have contributed
substantially to the fire.'
," No payments were made to 800 others who had little knowledge of what
happened at the time of the accident. Twenty of these rejected claimants appealed
to a special master.
' UPI, Aug. 26, 1983, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. This plain-
tiff was able to walk only with the support of crutches.
", High Court Upholds Multi-million Dollar Awards in Hyatt Skywalk Cases,
UPI, June 25, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
50 Id. In July 1986, another class action suit was filed on behalf of 1,000 res-
cuers, including firefighters, paramedics, police officers, doctors and nurses. See
New Round in Hyatt Skywalks Disaster, PR NEWSWIRE, July 3, 1986, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. We have not been able to find any record of
the outcome of this suit.
51 Pamela G. Hollie, Hundreds Are Injured as Blaze Traps 3,500 on the Upper
Floors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1980, at Al.
52 Id.
" Robert Lindsey, Spread of Las Vegas Fire Linked to Code Violations, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 1980, at Al.
" Id. Investigators believed that the smoke and carbon monoxide from the fire
could have been vented from the building if the violations had not existed.
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More than 1000 wrongful death and personal injury claims
were filed. Over 112 defendants were named, including the
MGM-Grand Hotel, Clark County,5 various subcontractors,
construction companies, and suppliers and manufacturers of
building materials, equipment and furnishings. MGM, which
had only $30 million in liability insurance at the time of the
fire, purchased $170 million in retroactive liability insurance
for a $35 million premium. 6
The hotel and other defendants quickly settled over 120
claims filed by one law firm that had substantial experience in
fire litigation and that had quickly begun physical examination
of the fire site. The remaining claims were "multidistricted"
and assigned to Judge Bechtle, of the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania. Judge Bechtle consolidated the cases, formed a
plaintiffs' management committee and instituted separate
discussions with plaintiffs' lawyers to establish damages, and
with defendants' lawyers to establish liability shares.57 Al-
though the litigation was not pursued as a class action, the col-
lective nature of Judge Bechtle's process was reinforced by
MGM-Grand's position that it would settle none of the remain-
ing claims unless all settled. In order to participate in this
process, plaintiffs' lawyers filed duplicate federal lawsuits for
claims that had already been filed in state courts.
In January 1983, MGM-Grand and forty-one other defen-
dants settled all claims, providing $138 million to the 1100
remaining personal injury and wrongful death claims and an
additional $2 million to property damage and business loss
claimants. The defendants paid between $30,000 and $45,000
each to the majority of claimants who were exposed to smoke
and trapped in their rooms for up to several hours. The largest
settlement, over $7 million, went to the orphaned children of
one of several couples killed in the fire. MGM-Grand paid $75
million of the settlement, while the heating and air condition-
ing contractor and electrical contractor each paid $10.5 million.
The settlement by the principle defendants placed great pres-
" Clark is the county in which Las Vegas is located. The plaintiffs claimed
that lax fire and building codes may have contributed to the rapid spread of the
fire.
16 MGM Hotel Fire Ignites Liability Insurance Sales, WASH. POST, Feb. 21,
1981, at E6.
"' In re MGM Grand Hotel Fire Litig., 570 F. Supp. 913 (D. Nev. 1983).
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sure on the remaining defendants. They faced substantial joint
and several liability, but would receive credits from the princi-
ple defendants that were limited to the amount of their settle-
ments. The total amount paid in settlements increased to $208
million over the next several years, as remaining defendants
settled individually or in small groups. According to some re-
ports, the plaintiffs eventually received more than they had
demanded in their original meetings with Judge Bechtle."
4. The DuPont Plaza Hotel Fire
On December 31, 1986, three arsonists set fire to the
DuPont Plaza Hotel, in San Juan, Puerto Rico, killing ninety-
seven people and injuring several hundred others.59 By the
time the case went to trial in March 1989, more than 2300
plaintiffs had filed claims against more than 250 defen-
dants." The principal defendants were: the Sheraton Corpora-
tion, the builder and original owner of the hotel; William Lyon,
Brian Corbell and William Eberle, individuals with financial
interests in forty-three partnerships and corporations connect-
ed to the hotel; and Theodore Smyth, who had a twenty-five
percent ownership interest in the hotel.6 However, as the
hotel only had one million dollars in liability insurance at the
time of the fire, almost everyone connected with the hotel was'
eventually named as a defendant in the suits, including the
manufacturer of the hotel's fire alarm, furniture manufacturers
and the manufacturer of the hotel casino slot machines.62
All federal cases were transferred to District Court Judge
Raymond Acosta, who consolidated the claims and divided
them into seven groups for trials on different issues.63 He also
58 This account of settlement outcomes is based in part on Professor Peterson's
discussions with attorneys involved in the litigation. See also $138 Million Award-
ed in Las Vegas Hotel Fire, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1983, at A12; Victims Get $140
Million in Fire Settlement, ENGINEERING NEWS-REC., May 19, 1983, at 20.
" Marcia Coyle, A $105 Million DuPont Solution, NA1?L L.J., May 22, 1989, at
3.
60 Id.
61 Peter Carbonara, Taming a Mass Torts Monster, AM. LAW., Sept. 1989, at
108_09.
62 Lawrence J. Tell, United They Stand--at the Defense Table, BUS. WK., May
30, 1988, at 102.
1 In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 129 F.R.D. 409 (D.P.R.
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appointed Judge Bechtle, who had presided over the MGM
Grand Hotel fire litigation, as settlement judge and divided the
defendants into three categories: the hotel corporation, the
products liability group and the services defendants.'
The division of defendants into categories facilitated settle-
ment of the claims. Sheraton, the builder and original owner of
the hotel, settled in the spring of 1987 for $36 million." Theo-
dore Smythe, part-owner of the hotel, also settled in the spring'
of 1987 for $8 million.6 Around the same time, the hotel's
architects and some product manufacturers settled the claims
against them for $3 million.6 7 After Judge Louis C. Bechtle in-
terpreted the hotel's $1 million per occurrence insurance policy
as providing $1 million for each set of discrete negligent acts in
May 1989,6" the hotel and its insurers settled the claims
against them for $105 million. 9 In June 1989, Bally Manu-
facturing Corporation, the manufacturer of the hotel's slot
machines which, the plaintiffs claimed, had emitted toxic gas
during the fire, settled for $2.1 million.7 ' The claims against
the remaining eighty products and services defendants went to
trial in late July 1989.
B. Pharmaceutical Products and Medical Devices
1. MER-29
A cholesterol-lowering drug, MER-29, was manufactured
by Richardson-Merrell, Inc. The company withdrew the drug
from the market in 1962, after its use was linked to irrevers-
ible cataracts and skin and hair problems in at least 5000
individuals.7 1 In 1963, officials of Richardson-Merrell pleaded
1989); In re Fire Disaster at Dupont Plaza Hotel, San Juan, Puerto Rico, on Dec.
31, 1986, 660 F. Supp. 982 (J.P.M.L. 1987).
Carbonara, supra note 61, at 108; Coyle, supra note 59, at 24.
Carbonara, supra note 61, at 111.
66 Id.
Id. at 112.
68 Id.
9 Coyle, supra note 59, at 3.
To Carbonara, supra note 61, at 113.
1 Morton Mintz, Jail Terms Sought for Business Health, Environment Violators;
Prison Terms Sought for Health and Environment Violators, WASH. POST, Nov. 25,
1979, at Al.
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nolo contendere to federal charges that Richardson had made
false and misleading statements to FDA officials about the
safety of the drug.72 The company was fined $80,000 and the
officials were placed on probation. Civil suits involving MER-
29 eventually cost the company an estimated $200 million.73
MER-29 is said to be the first mass tort litigation in which a
plaintiffs attorneys' litigation group was established to coordi-
nate efforts against the defendant.74
2. Bendectin
In 1956, the FDA approved Bendectin for the treatment of
"morning sickness" (nausea and vomiting) during pregnancy.7"
Richardson-Merrell (subsequently Merrell Dow) manufactured
and marketed the drug from 1956 to 1983. During that time
period, more than thirty million pregnant women used
Bendectin.v6 Litigation began with a 1977 Florida lawsuit
claiming that the mother's use of Bendectin during pregnancy
caused limb defects in a newborn infant.7 7 A 1979 National
Enquirer article describing the case stimulated subsequent
claims and public concern about the drug.78 The FDA respond-
ed to these concerns by convening its Advisory Committee on
Fertility and Maternal Health to re-evaluate the safety of the
drug.79 The Committee concluded that there was no conclusive
evidence that the drug was a teratogen (i.e., caused birth de-
fects) and, therefore, decided that the drug should not be re-
moved from the market.8" Notwithstanding, the number of
claims continued to rise" and, in 1983, Merrell Dow ceased
72 Justice Department Investigating Lilly's Marketing of Oraflex, NAT'L L.J., May
23, 1983, at 3.
73 Id.
7' Paul D. Rheingold, The MER129 Story: An Instance of Successful Mass Di-
saster Litigation, 56 CAL. L. REV. 116 (1968); see also David Ranii, How the
Plaintiffs' Bar Shares Its Information, NATL L.J., July 23, 1984, at 1.
"' Mark D. Nosacka, Bendectin, Birth Defects, and Brock: A Study in Appellate
Review, 13 J. PROD. LIAB. 231, 231 (1991).
76 Id.
71 Mekdeci v. Merkle Natl Labs., 711 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1983).
7' New Thalidomide-Type Scandal-Experts Reveal ... Common Drug Causing
Deformed Babies, NATL ENQUIRER, Oct. 9, 1979, at 20.
7' Nosacka, supra note 75, at 232.
so Id.
"1 Bendectin, 2 INSIDE LITIG. 44 (1988).
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manufacturing and marketing the drug. 2
In 1982, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
transferred all Bendectin cases then pending in the federal
courts to Judge Carl Rubin of the District Court for Southern
District of Ohio. 3 Judge Rubin had previously managed the
Beverly Hills Supper Club fire litigation. By 1985, more than
1100 Bendectin claims were before Judge Rubin.'I The parties
negotiated a settlement of all claims, which would have re-
quired Merrell Dow to pay $120 million over twenty years.
Because Merrell Dow insisted that the settlement bind all
claims, both present and future, the settlement was imple-
mented through a mandatory class action. Judge Rubin certi-
fied the class even though court-appointed experts could not
estimate the number of future claims and the court had made
no findings that Merrell Dow was a limited fund. The Sixth
Circuit reversed the certification because of the absence of lim-
ited fund findings.
Judge Rubin then ordered a consolidated trial for Febru-
ary 1985, which ultimately and effectively ended Bendectin as
a mass tort. Although the trial was mandatory only for law-
suits filed in Ohio, most plaintiffs chose to be included in the
trial. Indeed, the number of filings, which had doubled every
year between 1981 and 1984, increased greatly in the months
before the consolidated trial as plaintiffs' lawyers chose to have
their clients' cases determined at the trial.8 5 The trial was
trifurcated, with the issues of causation, liability and damages
to be heard and decided separately, in sequence. After the jury
ruled that plaintiffs had not established that use of Bendectin
during pregnancy was a proximate cause of birth defects by a
preponderance of the evidence,8 the litigation dwindled away.
82 Nosacka, supra note 75, at 233.
'In re Richardson-Merrel, "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 533 F.
Supp. 489 (J.P.M.L. 1982). Two cases reached a verdict prior to the J.P.M.L.
transfer, one resulting in a defense verdict and the other a verdict for the plain-
tiff. See David Lauter, Bendectin Pact Creating Furor: Revolt in the Plaintiffs' Bar,
NAT'L L.J., July 30, 1984, at 1.
84 Nosacka, supra note 75, at 233.
85 The number of filings in January and February 1985, alone, were almost as
many as the 636 claims filed in all of 1984. Interview with Alfred E. Schretter,
Special Staff Counsel, Merrell Dow (Nov. 21, 1988) (notes on file with the au-
thors).
8 In re Richardson-Merrell, "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212
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Over 1200 of the 1800 claims that had been filed by the time of
the consolidated trial were resolved by that trial." The de-
fense verdict in the consolidated trial effectively settled many
more claims. Many plaintiffs' lawyers concluded that the cases
were unwinnable and dismissed their claims or stipulated to
be bound by the defense verdict.88 A few cases, however, contin-
ued to progress individually, in both state and federal courts.
Most were decided in favor of defendants, often by summary
judgment, 9 and the few plaintiff verdicts were successfully
appealed in state and federal courts."
By 1993, courts generally had adopted the position that
the plaintiffs' experts and their scientific evidence could not
support a finding that Bendectin causes birth defects. Howev-
er, given the conflict among the Circuits on the appropriate-
ness of admitting the plaintiffs' evidence, the Supreme Court,
in 1992, agreed to hear a Ninth Circuit case, Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., which upheld the trial
court's granting of summary judgment to Merrell Dow on the
grounds that plaintiffs had insufficient evidence to establish
causation. 1 The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs'
metaanalysis of previous epidemiological studies92 was inad-
missible, in part because it had not been published in "peer
reviewed" journals.
Daubert became the vehicle for raising the fundamental
question of standards of admissibility for scientific evidence
before the Supreme Court. More than a dozen amici briefs
were filed with the court, on behalf of nobel laureates, profes-
sional scientific journals, special commissions and professional
(S.D. Ohio 1985); see Nosacka, supra note 75, at 233.
" Interview with Alfred E. Schretter, supra note 85.
" Fifty-one plaintiffs stipulated to be bound by the trial after the defense ver-
dict. Id.
89 As of July 1988, 19 cases (including the consolidated trial of 1100 cases) had
been tried, and all but four had resulted in defense verdicts. See Bendectin, supra
note 81.
' For a detailed analysis of Bendectin litigation, see Joseph Sanders, The
Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS
L.J. 301 (1992).
91 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 711 F. Supp. 546 (S.D. Cal. 1989),
affd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
92 Metaanalysis is an established scientific technique for analyzing the collected
results of multiple independent studies. The Daubert court was apparently unfa-
miliar with this technique.
[Vol. 59:961
UNDERSTANDING MASS LITIGATION
and trade associations, recommending diverse criteria for as-
sessing scientific validity. In its ruling, the Court rejected
formulaic approaches to assessing scientific evidence and laid
the responsibility for deciding admissibility squarely on the
trial judges' shoulders.3
3. DES
Diethylstilbestrol ("DES"), a synthetic estrogen, was first
produced in 1938, and was the first drug to be approved under
the 1939 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 4 A generic drug, DES
was produced by several American drug manufacturers.95 Orig-
inally approved by the FDA for the treatment of vaginitis, gon-
orrhea, menopausal symptoms and to suppress lactation,96 it
was eventually prescribed for a variety of other medical condi-
tions as well, including the prevention of miscarriage and preg-
nancy complications.97 An estimated four to six million Ameri-
cans (mothers and their offspring) were exposed to DES during
pregnancy." Over 300 manufacturers produced the drug, with
Eli Lilly & Co. capturing about 75% of the market.99
In 1970, research by gynecologists at the Massachusetts
General Hospital linked intrauterine exposure to DES to clear
cell adenocarcinoma in young women, a rare form of malignant
vaginal cancer that usually appears in women over fifty years
old.100 In 1971, the FDA required product-labeling of DES to
state that DES was contra-indicated for use in the prevention
"' Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2786.
01 ROBERTA J. APFEL & SUSAN M. FISHER, To Do No HARM: DES AND THE
DILEmiAS OF MODERN MEDICINE 215 (1984).
" ROBERT MEYERS, DES: THE BITTER PILL 226 (1983).
" Id. at 18.
5 APFEL & FISHER, supra note 94, at 1. Between 1941 and 1947, DES was
used during pregnancy without FDA approval. In 1947, several drug companies
filed a New Drug Application to permit use of DES during pregnancy. In 1952,
the FDA declared that DES was safe and no longer a new drug requiring annual
approval. Id. at 19-20. In subsequent years, moreover, a series of studies investi-
gating the effect of DES on the incidence of miscarriage reached contradictory
conclusions. By the 1960s, six of the seven leading obstetrical textbooks had con-
cluded that DES had no effect in preventing spontaneous abortions. Id. at 23-24.
" Id.
" Gail Appelson, Record Drug Verdict Against Lilly May Spur Settlements,
REUTER BUS. REP., Oct. 18, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTERS
File.
1C0 APFEL & FISHER, supra note 94, at 23-24.
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of miscarriages.' °' Since then intrauterine exposure to DES
has been associated with clear cell adenocarcinoma of the vagi-
na, adenosis, anatomical anomalies of the cervix, subfertility,
breast cancer and premature birth."2
The first successful lawsuits by DES-exposed women were
in 1979,03 when one plaintiff was awarded $800,000 from
White Laboratories after a jury found that the company had
manufactured the DES her mother had taken and that the
DES had caused the plaintiffs clear-cell vaginal cancer.0 " In
1980, in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, the California Supreme
Court held that DES-exposed plaintiffs could recover from drug
manufacturers for their injuries even though the plaintiffs
were unable to prove which drug manufacturer had produced
the drug. 5 The Sindell decision introduced the legal concept
of market-share liability, which allocates damage awards
among drug manufacturers according to the manufacturer's
share of the DES market. Sindell allowed plaintiffs who other-
wise would not have been able to recover to pursue their
claims by naming all drug manufacturers who had produced
the drug from 1941-1971.
Jury awards continued to grow. In 1982, a jury ordered
defendant E.R. Squibb & Sons to pay $2.2 million to a woman
whose mother had ingested DES; the woman had developed
clear cell vaginal cancer and was infertile as a result of cancer
treatments. 6 In 1983, Eli Lilly & Company paid $250,000 in
cash and $30,000 per year for life to settle a suit brought by a
twenty-one year-old woman who had been exposed to DES in
the womb and had developed vaginal cancer." 7
By 1985, DES litigation had grown exponentially.' 8 More
than 600 lawsuits had been brought by over 6000 named plain-
tiffs. 9 In Connecticut, a class action was filed on behalf of
12,000 to 20,000 Connecticut women exposed to DES; the
101 Id.
'0 Id. at 47.
1' MEYERS, supra note 95, at 222.
1 Id. at 223.
0 Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980); see MEYERS, supra note 95, at 216.
"06 MEYERS, supra note 95, at 222.
'07 Id. at 221.
'8 Id. at 223.
109 Id.
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plaintiffs' claims ranged from emotional distress to wrongful
death.11° In October 1991, a New York state jury awarded
$12.2 million to a DES victim, and an additional $550,000 to
her spouse. As the jury prepared to reconvene to consider
whether punitive damages should be awarded, Lilly abruptly
settled the case for an undisclosed amount. Attorneys for Eli
Lilly estimated that there were then 1000 DES cases pending
nationwide, 600 of which named Eli Lilly as defendant. 1 '
4. The Dalkon Shield
The litigation spawned by the Dalkon Shield is the largest
medical products liability litigation in United States history.
Over 190,000 people filed injury-related claims in the A.H.
Robins, Inc., ("Robins") bankruptcy proceedings. Robins was
the sole manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield. Approximately
15,000 personal injury claims were filed against Robins prior
to the bankruptcy. In 1988, over a decade after the litigation
began, a $2.475 billion trust was established to compensate
Shield claimants.
In January 1971, A.H. Robins, a 123-year-old, well-respect-
ed pharmaceutical company, began to market an intrauterine
contraceptive device ("IUD") known as the Dalkon Shield ("the
Shield"). Robins inaccurately claimed an extremely low preg-
nancy rate of 1.1 percent for the Shield, and the Shield quickly
outsold its competitors."' More than four million Shields were
distributed in over 80 countries, and at least 2.2 million Ameri-
can women were implanted with the device.13 In one record
month, over 88,000 Shields were implanted.14 This runaway
success generated gross revenues of $11,240,611 and a gross
profit of $505,499 for Robins." 5
By mid-1972, however, the Shield had a growing reputa-
tion among the medical community for higher-than-average
1 Id.
1 Appelson, supra note 99.
1 Catherine Breslin, Day of Reckoning, MS., June 1989, at 46.
n' MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST. CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN AND THE DALKON
SHIELD 3-5 (1985).
11 Breslin, supra note 112, at 46. The record month was April 1972.
1 MINTZ, supra note 113, at 5. The Shield cost only 25 cents to produce and
was sold at well over a 1000% markup for $4.35.
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rates of failure. More importantly, facts began to surface that
linked the Shield to Pelvic Inflammatory Disease ("PID"), and
to rare and often fatal septic abortions. The high rate of PID
was linked to the Shield's multifilamented tail string,"6 which
resulted in a phenomenon called "wicking"-a process by which
bacteria from the vagina were drawn into the usually sterile
uterus where they were insulated from the germ-fighting mu-
cus in the cervix."7 Robins' researchers discovered the wicking
in the Shield's tail, but company officials suppressed their
findings. The use of any I1D increases the risk of PID, but the
Shield-related risk was five times the risk associated with
other IUDs."'
As doctors became concerned by the rate of infections,
sales of the Shield began to slump. Robins responded by
launching an aggressive advertising campaign aimed at women
and physicians. Ads inaccurately touted a pregnancy rate of
.05 percent and claimed that the Shield was easy and painless
to insert."' In reality, the Shield had a pregnancy rate of 5.5
percent and its crab-like fins made it both painful to insert and
painful to remove. 2 '
On March 30, 1973, a thirty-year-old woman who had
become pregnant while using the Shield died after her infected
uterus spontaneously aborted a four-month old fetus.'2 ' A sub-
sequent FDA study found fourteen other septic abortions
among women using the Shield. The study further revealed
that of 287 septic abortions related to IUDs, 219 were in wom-
en using the Shield. At the request of the FDA, Robins sus-
pended domestic sales in June 1974. But the company contin-
ued to market the Shield abroad in seventy-nine other coun-
tries. By the time Robins suspended sales, the company had
116 The tail string enabled a woman to make sure that the IUD was still in
place and enabled a physician to remove the device by pulling on the string. The
string ran between the germ-ridden vagina and the sterile uterus. All other IUDs
on the market had tail strings with impervious monofilaments. Monofilament tail
strings prevented bacteria on the outside of the string from getting inside the
string and traveling into the uterus. See id. at 131.
117 RONALD BACIGAL, THE LnMTS OF LIGATION: THE DALKON SHIELD CONTRO-
VERSY 10 (1991).
118 Id.
n" Id. at 11.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 12.
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been sued by forty-seven Shield users."'
In 1975, a jury awarded a Shield plaintiff $10,000 in com-
pensatory damages and $75,000 in punitive damages.' By
1979, three thousand cases had been filed against Robins by
women who had used the Shield. The majority of these early
cases settled for an average cost of $11,000.124 The Dalkon
Shield litigation involved a variety of aggregative legal proce-
dures. Early in the litigation, federal suits were transferred to
the Western District of Kansas for Multi-District Litigation
("MDL") processing. After substantial discovery, the MDL
Judge transferred the cases back to the originating courts. This
aspect of the Shield litigation contrasts with many other in-
stances of mass torts, in which multidistricting for pretrial
processes ultimately resulted in resolution of most or all
claims.
Two efforts were made to establish class actions. In 1981,
Judge Spencer Willianis of the Northern District of California
established two class actions, a mandatory, nationwide limited
fund class for punitive damages and a voluntary class to decide
liability for California claims. 1" A.H. Robins had moved for
the punitive damage class, but opposed the voluntary, Califor-
nia class, as did virtually all plaintiffs' lawyers. The Ninth
Circuit vacated the judge's order regarding both classes, hold-
ing that Judge Williams had not made a finding that Robins
was a limited fund sufficient to support the mandatory, puni-
tive damage class and that the voluntary, California class did
not satisfy the typicality and adequate representation require-
ments of Federal Rule 23(a) and was not superior to other
means of adjudication.126
Four years later, A.H. Robins again tried to form a manda-
tory federal class action for punitive damage claims, an effort
opposed by virtually every plaintiffs' lawyer. Judge Robert
Mehrige of the Eastern District of Virginia denied class certifi-
12 Morton Mintz, Questions Arose Early on Contraceptive's Safety, WASH. POST,
Apr. 7, 1985, at Al, A6.
123 Deemer v. A.H. Robins Co, No. C-26420 (D. Sedgwick County, Kan., filed
Oct. 1974).
124 RICHARD SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW 14 (1991).
1 In re "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods., 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
12 In re N. Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
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cation, holding that Robins was collaterally estopped from
relitigating the finding of the earlier California decision that
the class did not meet the requirements of Rule 23(a).127
During this period Robins faced sharply increasing num-
bers of claims and judgments and paid increasingly larger
amounts to settle claims. Trial courts increasingly consolidated
the cases for discovery and trial. Consolidated discovery for a
large group of Minnesota claims proved particularly damaging
to Robins and embarrassing to executives of the Company. In
August 1985, after being held liable for two punitive damage
awards of $1.75 and $7.5 million, respectively, and facing im-
minent trials for which it had neither human nor financial
resources, Robins filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protec-
tion.2 ' By this time, Robins had paid out $378.3 million in
damages and $107.3 million in legal fees and over 5100 Shield
suits were pending. 29 In order to limit its liability for Dalkon
Shield claims, Robins launched a $5 million world-wide adver-
tising campaign to alert potential claimants of the bankruptcy
bar date. As a result, 327,000 claims were filed by the April 30,
1986 deadline for filing claims with the bankruptcy court. Of
these claims, 116,000 were eventually withdrawn or disquali-
fied. 130
In 1988, under an agreement worked out during the course
of the bankruptcy proceedings, Robins was purchased by Amer-
ican Home Products, with most of the proceeds going to a
$2.475 billion trust to compensate the Shield victims estab-
lished under the reorganization plan. Judge Mehrige also certi-
fied a related mandatory class action against Robins' insurer,
Aetna, executives of A.H. Robins and other defendants. These
defendants, principally Aetna, provided additional funds to the
trust and also to claimants who filed claims after the bar date.
Claimants began to receive settlement payments in 1989.13
12 In re Dalkon Shield Punitive Damages Litig., 613 F. Supp. 1112 (E.D. Va.
1985).
' BACIGAL, supra note 117.
' Id. at 47.
1I MINTz, supra note 113, at 3-20.
131 Breslin, supra note 112, at 52.
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5. Copper 7
An intrauterine device ('UD") manufactured by G.D.
Searle & Co ("Searle"), Copper 7 was a small piece of plastic
shaped like the number 7 with a small thread of copper wound
around its vertical arm. It was approved by the FDA and intro-
duced in 1974. Copper 7 was used by one million women in the
United States,132 and over seven million devices were sold
world-wide. By 1985, 742 lawsuits were pending against Searle
alleging that Copper 7 caused infertility, pelvic inflammatory
disease, ectopic pregnancies and perforations of the uterus.13 A
Business Week article claimed that it possessed internal com-
pany documents showing that Searle had "understated warn-
ings and overstated safety claims."'34 In 1985, the first Cop-
per 7 case went before a jury but was dismissed by the judge
after the jury was unable to agree on whether the device
harmed the plaintiff. 5
In January 1986, Searle discontinued sales of Copper 7
and Tatum 7, a similar, but less popular IUD. By then, the
company had been sued in 775 Copper 7 cases, ten of which
had gone to trial. Searle had won eight trials and been found
liable for a total of $310,000 in the two trials it lost. One hun-
dred seventy cases had been dismissed and 300 cases had
settled at an average of $6000 per case. Searle's costs to defend
these claims were estimated to have exceeded $10 million.
36
Searle won the next seven trials. 3 ' However, in March
1988 a federal judge unsealed hundreds of internal documents
that suggested that Searle had been concerned about the safe-
ty of the Copper 7 before it marketed the device. 138 In apparent
1" Michael L. Millenson, 600 Lawsuits Target Searle's Copper Contraceptive,
CHi. TRIB., Oct. 5, 1985, at 3.
1" William B. Glaberson, Did Searle Close Its Eyes to a Health Hazard?, BUS.
WK., Oct. 14, 1985, at 120.
124 Id.
13 Judge Declares a Mistrial in Searle Copper-7 Case, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17,
1985, at 42.
13' Robert Lowes, Copper 7 Lawsuits May Have Cost G.D. Searle $10 Million,
ST. LOUIS BUS. J., Mar. 10, 1986, at 6B. The U.S. sales of the two devices had
generated $11 million in sales for 1985. Id.
137 Law Journal: Copper 7 Battle Just Beginning, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 4, 1987,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
13 Tamar Lewin, Searle Documents Unsealed; Early IUD Worry is Implied, N.Y.
TwIES, Mar. 15, 1988, at D1.
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response, the FDA quickly announced that it had concluded
that Searle had not withheld data on the risks associated with
use of the Copper 719 The unsealed documents were used by
Robins, Kaplan, Ciresi and Miller, the law firm that had bro-
ken open the Dalkon Shield litigation, in a trial of a lawsuit
brought by Esther Kociemba; Ms. Kociemba alleged that she
had suffered infertility as a result of using Copper 7. In Sep-
tember 1988, the Kociemba jury decided that Searle had been
negligent in testing the Copper 7, that the company had failed
to warn users of the IUD's risks and that the Copper 7 caused
Ms. Kociemba's infertility. The jury returned a verdict of $1.75
million in compensatory damages and $7 million in punitive
damages. 4 ' Nine months later, during a California Copper 7
trial, Searle settled all of the 130 Copper 7 suits brought by
Robins, Kaplan for an undisclosed amount."'
The settlement had the effect of removing Robins,
Kaplan-which had been the most successful of the plaintiffs'
law firms representing Copper 7 users-from the litigation.
But, as part of this settlement, Robins, Kaplan made its docu-
ments available to lawyers representing the 350 remaining
Copper 7 cases. As a result, Searle still faced potentially sub-
stantial liability. Searle greatly reduced this threat when it
thwarted an attempt by one plaintiffs' law firm to collect many
of the remaining cases from throughout the country for trials
in one Maryland court, by obtaining a ruling that these cases
should not have been filed in Maryland. Because no law firm
could afford to prosecute the claims individually in different
courts throughout the country, Searle thereby succeeded in
ending mass litigation of Copper 7 cases.
139 U.S. Agency Satisfied with Data on Monsanto Contraceptive, REUTERS, Mar.
18, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTERS File.
140 Julia F. Siler, Drug Maker Told to Pay $8 Million Over Birth Device, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 1988, at Al. In a letter to the district court judge who presided
over the case, three jurors reported that they had been intimidated and harassed
by the jury foreman and were unable to express their opinions. They also claimed
that some jurors had ignored the judge's instructions about the case. See Julia F.
Siler, 3 Jurors See Case Improprieties, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1988, at D5.
141 Searle to Settle 130 IUD Suits, UPI, June 16, 1989, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File.
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6. The Shiley Heart Valve
Approved by FDA in 1979, the Bjork-Shiley Con-
vexo/Concave heart valve was manufactured and distributed by
Pfizer, Inc. between 1979 and 1986. More than 80,000 valves
were implanted worldwide.' By 1980, Shiley had begun to
receive reports of valve failures, caused by fractures at the
point where struts were welded to the valve rings. The valve
has been linked to approximately 134 deaths worldwide.1
3
Shiley withdrew the valve from the market in 1986.
In February 1990 the investigations sub-committee of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce (chaired by Repre-
sentative John Dingell) released a report accusing the FDA of
allowing Shiley to market faulty products even though the
regulators and the company were aware of problems with the
products.' The following day, Pfizer shareholders filed a class-
action suit against the company, claiming that company execu-
tives withheld information about the impact of the valve on the
financial health of the company.4 ' In March 1990, Public Citi-
zen, a non-profit consumer watchdog group filed a class action
suit against Shiley, demanding that all valve recipients receive
a prompt medical consultation and a warning about the possi-
bility of valve fractures. 46 In December 1990, Shiley launched
a nationwide recall campaign. Shiley sent letters to every car-
diologist and cardiovascular surgeon registered with the Amer-
ican Medical Association asking that doctors warn patients
implanted with the valve of its potential problems.'47
Litigation of claims involving actual failures of the Shiley
valve was significant. Each of the estimated three hundred
deaths and, perhaps, a similar number of failures that were
corrected through emergency surgery, involved substantial
compensatory damages. In addition, Shiley and Pfizer faced a
142 Malcolm Gladwell, Pfizer Recalls Artificial Heart Valve, WASH. POST, Dec. 11,
1990, at A3.
14 Evan Roth, STATES NEWS SERV., May 25, 1988 (untitled news abstract).
144 Robert W. Stewart, Report Attacks Sale of Faulty Heart Devices, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 1990, at A3.
14 Shareholders Sue Maker of Heart Valve, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1990, at D7.
.4. Catherine Gevertz, Nader Group Sues Heart Valve Firm, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
22, 1990, at A3. The suit was later dismissed. See Sonni Efron, Heart Valve Firm,
Plaintiffs Battle Under Tons of Paper, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1991, at D5.
147 Gladwell, supra note 142, at A3.
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serious threat of punitive damages in these cases. Although
there is no public information about the costs of this litigation,
Shiley apparently had settled approximately 200 law suits for
valve failures by 1990, with some settlements rumored to ex-
ceed $1 million. "8
Although exposure for these claims was significant, even
more threatening was the specter of massive litigation by per-
sons whose valves had not yet failed. If the courts permitted
these Shiley heart valve users to sue for damages, Shiley
would face tens of thousands of smaller, but still substantial
claims. Thus, the course of the Shiley heart valve litigation
turned primarily on the treatment and representation of Shiley
users whose valves had not failed, rather than on the wrongful
death and serious injury claims associated with those who had
already experienced valve failures.
A substantial amount of this litigation occurred in Califor-
nia, where courts ruled that residents of that state could sue
for the emotional distress associated with being implanted
with a valve that might fail. A California appellate court ruled
in 1988 that persons implanted with the Shiley valve could
receive damages for emotional distress, if they could show that
Shiley withheld information about the defect. "9 Subsequent
California decisions narrowed this ruling. Although Shiley was
headquartered in California, courts there held that neither
foreign nationals nor residents of other states could sue Shiley
for emotional distress in California. 50
Much of the California litigation was carried forward by
Robins, Kaplan, Ciresi and Miller, the leading plaintiffs' law
firm in the Dalkon Shield and Copper 7 litigations. While that
firm was proceeding with its cases individually, two class ac-
tions were filed in California courts. One, filed in January
1991 by a Miami, Florida law firm on behalf of all 55,000 Unit-
ed States recipients of the Convexo-Concave heart valve, was
never certified as a class.'5' In June 1991, Federal Judge Harry
148 Id.
149 Sonni Efron, Heart Valve Maker Offered to Settle Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
25, 1992, at Al.
15 Id.; see also Plaintiffs Lose Round in Shiley Valve Fight, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6,
1992, at D5. Shiley is located in Orange County, California.
... Gregory Crouch, Suit Alleges Pfizer, Shiley Tried to Hide Heart Valve De-
fects, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1991, at Dl. Although more than 80,000 valves had been
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L. Hupp ruled in that case that class members with working
valves who had never heard of the valve's problems had no
cause of action.152 A second class action was filed in September
1981 for sixty-one plaintiffs implanted with the valve who
claimed to have suffered emotional distress.'53 A third, volun-
tary nationwide class action was filed in federal court in Cin-
cinnati by several lawyers including Stanley Chesley, a
plaintiffs' lawyer noted for his class action practice.'54 Judge S.
Arthur Spiegel (Southern District of Ohio) approved a settle-
ment of this class action in August 1992. The settlement al-
lows victims of fractured valves or their estates to receive up to
$2 million each and creates a $75 million fund for research on
procedures to detect defective valves in situ.' The settlement
allows payments between $2500 and $4000 each to class mem-
bers whose valves have not failed. The settlement is currently
being appealed by members of the class who claim that it is
inadequate because x-ray procedures cost more than the maxi-
mum of $4000.
Approximately 850 claimants opted out of the class, many
of them California plaintiffs. In November 1992, Pfizer paid
$35 million to settle with 333 of these plaintiffs, who were
represented by Robins, Kaplan, Ciresi and Miller. Payments to
these plaintiffs were reported to range between $40,000 and
$300,000, with an average of $103,000 each. 55 In September
1993, Pfizer settled another 256 California emotional distress
claims under a formula reported to emulate the earlier Robins,
Kaplan settlement and rumored to total around $26
million.'57
If the settlement of the Cincinnati class action is sustained
implanted worldwide, by 1990, only 55,000 of those recipients were estimated to
be alive. See Gladwell, supra note 142.
12 Bob Schwartz, Class Action Denied by Court in Shiley Lawsuit, L.A. TIMES,
June 4, 1991, at D7.
.. Efron, supra note 146, at D5.
.. Alison Frankel, Et tu, Stan?, Am. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 68.
..5 Ted Johnson, $215 Million Shiley Valve Settlement Approved, LA. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 1992, at D1. The total value of the settlement is generally reported to be
$215 million. However, Chesley reportedly has valued the settlement at $500 mil-
lion, and he and other class counsel have requested fees totaling $21 million,
based on this valuation. See Frankel, supra note 154, at 68.
... Johnson, supra note 155, at D12; see also Frankel, supra note 154, at 70.
.. James M. Gomez & Debora Vrana, Judge OKs Settlement in Heart Valve
Suit, L.A. TIES, Sept. 3, 1993, at D1.
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on appeal, Pfizer will have effectively ended the Shiley litiga-
tion as a mass tort with its settlement of the two groups of
California cases. Almost all present and future claims based on
valve failure will be handled through the procedures of the
Cincinnati settlement. At most, 250 opt-out claims remain to
be settled. Most will involve claims of emotional distress which
may not be legally cognizable outside of California. Those that
involve valve failures can be tried as ordinary tort claims.
7. Silicone breast implants
First marketed by Dow Corning in 1963,158 silicone breast
implants were considered to be an improvement over liquid
silicone injections, which 50,000 women had received to aug-
ment their breasts.'59 By 1992, an estimated two million wom-
en had silicone implants inserted, about twenty percent for
reconstructive purposes, after mastectomies or to correct con-
genital deformities, and eighty percent for cosmetic rea-
sons.
160
In 1977, a plaintiff who had suffered acute inflammation
in her breast tissues after her implants ruptured was awarded
$170,000 in the first successful breast implant lawsuit against
Dow Coming.'6 ' Between 1982 and December 1991, six silicone
gel implant cases went to trial; five resulted in plaintiff's ver-
dicts.
162
When the silicone breast implants came on the market,
the FDA lacked the authority to regulate medical devices. As a
result, it did not evaluate silicone gel and saline breast im-
plants for safety and effectiveness. 163 In 1976, Congress passed
legislation that was aimed at closing the loophole in the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Safety Act that excluded medical devices
from FDA regulation. Under the new legislation, however,
implants were allowed to stay on the market while FDA con-
1. Alison Frankel, From Pioneers to Profits, AM. LAW., June 1992, at 84.
159 Id.
160 Id.
1 Deborah Tedford, Revelation Old News to Texas Woman, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Feb. 11, 1992, at A6.
162 Frankel, supra note 158, at 84.
"' William Booth, Breast Implants Allowed; Devices to Remain on Market De-
spite Lack of Safety Data, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1991, at Al.
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sidered their safety.' In 1982, the FDA proposed classifying
the silicone gel implants as Class III devices. This classifica-
tion would have required the manufacturer to prove the safety
of the implants in order to keep them on the market.6 ' Howe-
er, the silicone implants were not classified as Class III until
1988. The decision to classify the implants as Class III devices
was prompted by scientific data suggesting that silicone may
migrate throughout the body of an implant recipient with un-
known long-term effects.'66
In November 1988, the consumer group, "Public Citizen,"
called for a ban on silicone gel implants, citing internal docu-
ments from the FDA and Dow Corning, Inc., (the largest im-
plant manufacturer with thirty percent of the market), that
stated that the gel caused malignant cancers in twenty-three
percent of the animals tested.6 7 Public Citizen revealed that
the FDA had been debating the safety of the implants for sev-
eral months and leaked FDA memoranda suggesting that some
FDA scientists considered the evidence alarming enough for
the agency to issue a public warning and distribute informa-
tional leaflets to all past, current and future patients.' After
unsuccessfully petitioning the FDA to ban the implants, Public
Citizen filed a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act
in 1989 to force the FDA to release the results of animal tests
of silicone implants. In November 1990, a federal judge ordered
the FDA to release the results of the tests.'69
One year later, in November 1991, an advisory panel of
outside experts recommended to the FDA that the silicone gel
' Frankel, supra note 158, at 93.
"' Id. The FDA was concerned about silicone gel "bleeding" from the implants
and the possible long-term effects of silicone.
I' d.
167 Ban on Breast Implants Is Urged, LA. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1998, at 1.
1 Silicone Gel Found to Cause Cancer in Laboratory Rats; Citizens' Group
Calls For Ban on Breast Implants, WASH. PosT, Nov. 10, 1988, at A3. The docu-
ments cited by Public Citizen revealed that between 20 and 26% of rats injected
with silicone developed fibrosarcoma tumors, densely-packed tumors arising from
the tough, fiber-producing cells of the body's connective tumor. Between 18 and
21% of the tumors became malignant and cancerous tumors developed throughout
the animals bodies. Eighty-five percent of the animals with fibrosarcomas died.
Dow Corning agreed that the injections caused sarcomas but claimed that it was a
"purely rodent phenomenon."
1 FDA Ordered to Release Breast Implant Test, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1990,
at A2.
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breast implants should stay on the market while the manufac-
turers conducted additional tests, even though there was an
"appalling" lack of information about their safety.7 ° A month
later, in December 1991, a San Francisco federal jury awarded
$7.3 million to a woman who claimed that her implants had
caused a permanent auto-immune disorder.'7' The jury based
its verdict on internal Dow Corning memoranda suggesting
that the company had known since the early 1970's that there
may be health problems associated with the silicone implants;
the jury found that Dow had acted with fraud, oppression and
malice.'72
Soon afterward, Dr. Norman Anderson, a member of the
FDA General Devices and Plastic Surgery Devices panel stated
in a letter to the FDA that the company had improperly with-
held data about safety problems associated with the im-
plants. 73 Dr. Anderson's charges were based upon information
revealed during discovery in the San Francisco lawsuit. The
documents were made available to the FDA but were not re-
leased to the general public because of a protective court order
which sealed the documents.
On January 7, 1992, the FDA called for a forty-five day
moratorium on the sale and implantation of silicone gel breast
implants to allow time to review new data about the safety of
the devices. 74 The FDA imposed the voluntary moratorium
after reviewing internal memoranda in which Dow Corning
personnel questioned the safety of the devices. Some of the
sealed documents were leaked to the New York Times, which
reported that the documents suggested that Dow Corning had
conducted inadequate research.'75 Dow Corning responded that
the memoranda represented an internal conversation about the
safety of the implants and that although the company knew
about the silicone leaks in the early 1970s it believed silicone
17' Id. Several manufacturers ceased manufacturing implants to avoid compli-
ance with the FDA approval process.
17. Marlene Cimons, Breast Implant Maker Falsifies Data, FDA Says, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 1991, at Al.
172 Briefly: Consumer Products, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1991, at D2.
173 Id.
17 Karen Riley, FDA Sets 45 day Hiatus For Implants, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 7,
1992, at Al.
' Phillip Hilts, Dow Delayed Implant Tests for a Decade, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Jan. 13, 1992, at Al.
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would not have any serious health effects.'76
Prohibited by law from releasing the contents of Dow
Corning's internal memoranda, the FDA publicly requested
that Dow release the documents to the public.'77 Dow Corning
released the internal memoranda in February 1992.178 The
memoranda confirmed that the company had known for years
that its silicone gel implants often ruptured and leaked silicone
into women's bodies. Dow Corning replaced its CEO the same
week.
A week later the FDA reported that new scientific evi-
dence about the implants showed that they leaked more than
was previously believed and that the gel may cause health
problems.179 The FDA advisory stated that it may take years
for the leaks to begin and there is no way to determine how
many women with implants and without symptoms may have
suffered undetected leaks. The panel also stated that some
evidence indicates that gel leaks may cause immune diseases
and neurological disorders. 8 Rheumatologists also reported a
possible link between silicone implants, lupus and connective
tissue disorder. The advisory panel also stated that Dow Com-
ing documents raised questions about the strength of silicone
envelopes that contain the gel.'' The FDA report was based
upon preliminary findings from five weeks of intensive inspec-
tions of four implant makers, Dow, Bioplasty, McGhan and
Mentor.
On February 21, 1992, the advisory panel recommended
that the use of silicone gel implants be substantially restricted.
The panel reported that there was no conclusive evidence link-
ing silicone with a particular disease but that time was needed
to examine the evidence.8 2 In March, Dow Corning announced
..6 Id. at A3.
177 Id. Meanwhile, the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office commenced
a criminal investigation into Dow's conduct to determine whether the company had
sold the implants without fully disclosing information about their health hazards.
See Robert Steinbrook & Henry Weinstein, County Will Investigate Maker of Breast
Implants, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1992, at B1.
178 Marlene Cimons, Data Raises New Concerns on Breast Implant Safety, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1992, at Al.
.7 FDA: Implants Leak More Than Thought, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 19, 1992, at 4.
187 Id.
,81 Id.
' Phillip J. Hilts, Implant Restrictions Urged, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 21, 1992,
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that it would no longer manufacture the implants." In Novem-
ber 1992, Dow Corning disclosed in discussions with the FDA
that an unknown number of silicone gel implant quality con-
trol records had been faked."M
In April 1992, the FDA lifted the moratorium on gel im-
plants but placed strict limitations on their use. All breast
cancer patients and women with deformed or injured breasts
were to have full access to the implants if they agree to partici-
pate in a research study. But only a few hundred women who
desire implants for cosmetic reasons have been allowed to
participate in the clinical trials.185
In December 1992, a Texas state jury awarded a woman
$5 million in compensatory damages and $20 million in puni-
tive damages for injuries due to silicone breast implants. With
an additional $2 million award in attorney fees and $1 million
in prejudgment interest, the total verdict amounted to $28 mil-
lion.18
6
By Spring 1993, there were approximately 1000 cases
pending in federal court.8 7 By order of the Judicial Panel on
Multi-District Litigation, the federal cases have been assigned
to Alabama federal Judge Sam C. Pointer Jr., for pretrial man-
agement.' About 12,000 suits had been filed in state and
federal courts by spring, 1994, approximately 6800 against
Dow Corning alone."9 The most common injuries claimed by
the plaintiffs are: acute inflammation, auto-immune disorders,
lupus, scleroderma and chronic arthropathy.'" Most suits are
at Al.
18 Joel Kurtzman, Dow Gives Up Implants, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1992, at C2.
18 Dow Coming, FDA Discussing Report, STAR TRIM., Nov. 4, 1992, at D3.
18 Karen Riley, Silicone Implants Given Limited OK, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 17,
1992, at Cl.
1 Margaret C. Fisk, Products Liability, 1992"s Largest Verdicts, NAr'L L.J., Jan.
25, 1993, at S14.
" Saundra Torry, The Race to Represent Breast-Implant Victims, WASH. POST,
Mar. 9, 1992, at F5.
8 See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 93-926, 1993
WL 199129 (J.P.M.L. May 4, 1993).
" Henry Weinstein, Breast Implant Litigation Close to $4 Billion Deal, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 1994, at Al, A20.
1"o Robert Steinbrook, Link Between Implants, Immune Disease Seen, LA. TIMES,
Jan. 20, 1992, at Al. Scleroderma is a rheumatic disease in which the skin hard-
ens and organs deteriorate. Some breast implant recipients exhibit some symptoms
of a scleroderma-the skin hardens but the organs do not deteriorate. "Chronic
silicone arthropathy" is a disease that causes joint, muscle and nerve pains. Id.
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against Dow Corning, Bioplasty, McGhan, Mentor, Bristol-
Myers Squibb, General Electric and Baxter International
Inc. 191
In July 1993 Dow Corning and other implant manufactur-
ers sued more than seventy insurance companies in California
state court for failure to defend and indemnify them in breast
implant litigation. The implant manufacturers asked that
insurers be ordered to fund whatever amount breast implant
claimants ultimately secure in settlement or at trial; they also
requested compensatory damages and unspecified punitive
damages for breach of contract and breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing.
192
In September 1993 Dow Corning proposed a $4.75 billion
settlement of all pending and future breast implant cases.
Funds for the settlement would be provided by Dow Corning,
other implant manufacturers and suppliers of the raw materi-
als used to manufacture the implants, as well as doctors, hos-
pitals and insurers. Exactly how costs would be allocated had
not been decided at the time the settlement offer was an-
nounced; nor was it clear how many plaintiffs the settlement
would cover. Plaintiff lawyers supporting the settlement in
concept asserted that it would provide claimants amounts
ranging between $200,000 to $2 million. Other attorneys, how-
ever, noting that one to two million women in the United
States have had breast implants and that the latency period of
claimed injuries may range up to twenty-five years, contended
that the $4.75 billion settlement offer would fall far short of
the amount needed to compensate women.9
The number of persons possibly injured by silicone im-
plants may be beyond that covered by the proposed class ac-
tion. For example, a study reported in January 1991 found
health problems among children who had been nursed by
mothers with silicone implants. In October 1993, newspaper
... McGhan acquired its implant business from the 3M Corporation, which be-
gan making silicone breast implants in 1977. Barnaby J. Redir, Millions Awarded
in Implant Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1994 at A7.
" Breast Implant Makers Sue Their Insurers, LA. DAILY J., July 6, 1993, at 1,
10.
193 David R. Olmas, Dow Proposes $4.75 Billion to Settle Breast Implant Suits,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1993, at D1. The final settlement was announced on March
23, 1994.
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accounts questioned the safety of silicone penile implants,194
and indicated that litigation involving male implantees is un-
derway. 95 Approximately 28,000 men receive penile implants
annually.
196
C. Food and Diet Supplements
1. Salmonella
In March and April 1985, one of the largest outbreaks of
salmonella poisoning occurred when milk processed at the
Hillfarm dairy in Illinois was accidentally contaminated with
salmonella bacteria. Three separate batches of milk from the
dairy with expiration dates a few weeks apart were found to be
contaminated. The first outbreak was linked to milk with a
March 29th expiration date.' 97 On April 9, Jewel Food Stores,
which owned the Hillfarm dairy, pulled dairy products from its
grocery stores after there were more reports of salmonella
poisoning.1 98 Soon afterward, Hillfarm was identified as the
source of the tainted milk.199
Six people died as a result of salmonella poisoning caused
by Hillfarm dairy products."' Over 180,000 people in Illinois
and surrounding states were affected by the milk, with the
majority suffering from fevers, nausea, cramps, diarrhea and
headaches.2' Over the next three years, individuals filed nine-
teen thousand claims alleging injury from the tainted milk.0 2
Although some of the suits named the manufacturer and dis-
tributor of the milk cartons as defendants, the principal defen-
dant was Jewel Food Stores of Chicago.
19 Shari Roan, Silicone Implants: Men's Turn to Worry, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26,
1993, at El.
195 Id.
19 Id. at E3.
19 Christopher Drew & John Van, Milk Plant Inspected for Clues to Epidemic,
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 11, 1985, at 1.
... John Van, Jewel Closes Hillfarm Dairy Chain Recalls All Milk, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 10, 1985, at 1.
19. John Van, Salmonella to Near Peak This Week; Dairy Produced More Tainted
Milk Until Closing, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 16, 1985, at 1.
2o" William Mullen, In U.S., Court Is Now First Resort, CHI. TRIB., July 21,
1991, at 1.
201 Id.
202 Id.
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In May 1985, all pending and future suits filed in Cook
County were consolidated before one judge (who had previously
overseen all asbestos-related proceedings in Cook County) for
pretrial and discovery purposes. The court established a case
management scheme which appointed coordinating plaintiffs'
counsel, unified all pretrial motions and required the plaintiffs'
attorney to file a consolidated complaint that incorporated all
the liability theories pleaded in the 100 complaints then pend-
ing. In August 1985, a class of 18,000 claimants was certified
over the defendants' objections. Three separate classes were
certified, two for compensatory damages and one for punitive
damages. Approximately 1400 plaintiffs opted out of these
classes to pursue their claims individually.
In late 1986, prior to a trial on the issue of punitive dam-
ages, Jewel admitted liability for the outbreak and offered to
pay compensatory damages, including medical expenses, to
plaintiffs. The parties went to trial on the issue of punitive
damages and, in January 1987, the jury returned a defense
verdict. The verdict effectively ended the litigation as a mass
tort. Because the majority of claims only alleged transitory,
minor injuries, their value depended on the potential for puni-
tive damages. With that potential removed, the costs to attor-
neys of proceeding outweighed the benefit. As a consequence,
after the verdict, the plaintiffs and defense attorney developed
a formula to determine the amount of compensatory damages
each class member would receive."'
2. L-Tryptophan
An essential amino acid normally supplied by protein in
the diet, L-Tryptophan is used by the body to synthesize the
brain chemical serotonin, which is linked to sleep as well as to
feelings of fullness and general emotional well-being.24 L-tryp-
203 See Salmonella Outbreak Traced, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1985, at C6; More
Tainted Milk Discovered, UPI, Apr. 16, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File. Parts of this summary were drawn from an unpublished case study
conducted by Mark Peterson (on file with the authors).
22 Sandy Rovner, The Risks of Rapid Weight-Loss Programs, WASH. POST, Apr.
3, 1990, at Z17. There are 19 lawsuits pending against Nutri-System filed by
claimants in Florida who allege that the Nutri-System plan caused their gallblad-
der disease.
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tophan was used as a dietary supplement, recommended to
dieters on low-calorie or liquid protein diets and used in the
products of weight-loss programs such as Nutri-System. °5 It
has also been used to treat insomnia, premenstrual syndrome,
stress and depression,"6 and was available without a prescrip-
tion at most health foods stores." 7 Over 380 companies manu-
factured L-tryptophan, the most prominent of which were Jap-
anese corporations: Showa Denko, KIK; Ajinomoto Corp.;
Kwoya Hakko Kogyo Co., Ltd.; Mitsui Toatsu Chemicals, Inc.;
Nippon Kayaku Co. Ltd.; and Tanabe Seiyaku Co., Ltd.0 8
On November 11, 1989, the FDA issued a warning advis-
ing people to discontinue using L-Tryptophan." 9 On November
17, the FDA announced its intention to seek a voluntary na-
tionwide recall of products that contained enough L-Trypto-
phan to result in a daily intake of 100 milligrams or more of
the dietary supplement.21 The agency reported that it was
investigating a possible link between ingestion of the supple-
ment and at least 243 cases of eosinophilia-myalgia syndrome
("EMS"), a blood disorder that causes high fever, weakness,
muscle aches, joint pain, rashes, pneumonia, shortness of
breath and, in extreme cases, death.21' On November 22, Natu-
ral Alternatives International, Inc. ordered a recall of all L-
Tryptophan products manufactured by the company within the
previous twelve months.212 Two days later, the FDA announced
that a study had conclusively linked EMS with ingestion of di-
etary supplements containing L-Tryptophan.
In February 1990, a plaintiff who was hospitalized with
pneumonia-like symptoms after using L-Tryptophan filed a
class-action suit against General Nutrition Corp., Union Sta-
205 Id.
2' Ken Sugar, Tighter Regulation May Have Averted L-Tryptophan Problem,
UPI, May 17, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
20 L-Tryptophan was classified as a food and, therefore, was not subject to the
rigorous safety testing required of new drugs.
208 Sugar, supra note 206.
2' Lawrence K. Altman, Officials Investigating Drugs' Role in Illness, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1989, at A26.
21 Id.; see also Sugar, supra note 206.
21 Altman, supra note 209, at 26.
22 Natural Alternatives International Inc. Recalls All Single Entity L-Tryptophan
Products, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 22, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI
File.
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tion Drugs, Inc. and Windmill Natural Vitamin Co., Inc., alleg-
ing that the companies failed to warn users of the medical
risks associated with the supplement.213 In March 1990, the
FDA expanded the recall of L-Tryptophan to include all prod-
ucts that contained even trace amounts of the supplement and
announced that use of the supplement had been linked to 19
deaths and 1411 cases of EMS to date.214 That same month, a
Seattle woman alleging that her health problems were caused
by L-Tryptophan filed suit in federal court against six Japa-
nese corporations."' In April 1990, Nutri-System voluntarily
withdrew all its foods containing L-Tryptophan.2 6 Later that
month, researchers linked the cases of EMS to contaminated
L-Tryptophan manufactured by a single Japanese chemical
firm, Showa Denko K.K.2"
By August 1990, over 1500 cases of EMS and 27 deaths
had been linked to use of L-Tryptophan."' On December 26,
1991 Showa Denko announced the payment of $59.44 million
to settle an undisclosed number of claims arising from the sale
of contaminated L-Tryptophan in the United States.219
D. Chemicals and Toxic Substances
1. Agent Orange
Used as a defoliant by U.S. forces in Vietnam, Agent Or-
ange is an herbicide containing small amounts of dioxin as a
21' L-Tryptophan Distributors Must Freeze Records of Drug Use Sales, UPI, Feb.
27, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
214 Id.
215 Constantine Angelos, Suit Filed by User of Diet Supplement L-Tryptophan,
SEATmLE TIMEs, Mar. 23, 1990, at B4.
216 Rovner, supra note 204, at Z17.
117 L-Tryptophan Malady Linked to Single Japanese Firm, REUTERS, Apr. 27,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTERS File. The supplement manu-
factured by Showa Denko was contaminated with a chemical compound used to
filter impurities from the supplement.
218 Lawrence K. Altman, Two Advances Are Cited in Tracing Mystery Disorder,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1990, at A20.
219 Showa Denki Pays $59.44 Million in L-Tryptophan Claims, A YOMIURI NEWS
SERV., Dec. 26, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. The settle-
ment was reported pursuant to Japanese Securities regulations, which required
Showa Denko to report the settlement as the payment exceeded the corporation's
combined assets by one percent.
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contaminating product. Agent Orange litigation arose when
returning Vietnam veterans claimed that, as a result of expo-
sure to dioxin-tainted Agent Orange they suffered a variety of
injuries, including cancers, skin disorders and birth defects in
children conceived after their return. From its inception, the
litigation was entangled in the emotional and political contro-
versies surrounding the Vietnam War.22
The first claim alleging personal injuries due to exposure
to Agent Orange was filed in 1978. In 1979, the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation transferred the cases to Judge
George Pratt of the Eastern District of New York. The case
was subsequently passed to Judge Jack B. Weinstein, who
certified a voluntary class to decide common issues of liability
and causation and a mandatory class to decide punitive dam-
ages. 1 An estimated 250,000 claimants were included in the
class.222
By all reports, Judge Weinstein exerted considerable pres-
sure on the parties to reach a settlement of the case.2" On the
eve of trial, in Spring 1984, the manufacturers agreed to pay
$180 million to resolve the case, the highest amount to that
date for mass tort litigation. The defendants, however, contin-
ued to deny liability, and Judge Weinstein subsequently dis-
missed the claims of those who had opted-out of the class ac-
tion settlement on the grounds that the government
contractor's defense prevented liability and that there was
insufficient evidence to establish a causal link between dioxin
and the veterans' claimed injuries."" After agreement was
reached on the $180 million settlement, a special master ap-
pointed by Judge Weinstein drew up an allocation scheme,
establishing a schedule of damages. The court selected Aetna
Insurance Company to process and pay the claims.225
Litigation over Agent Orange continued for several more
220 For a comprehensive discussion and analysis of Agent Orange litigation, see
SCHUCK, supra note 10. This precis draws heavily on Schuck's work, and on MARK
PETERSON & MOLLY SELVIN, RESOLUTION OF MASS TORTS: TOWARD A FRAMEWORK
FOR EVALUATION OF AGGREGATIVE PROCEDURES (1988).
22' PETERSON & SELVIN, supra note 220, at 51.
222 Id. at 50.
See SCHUCK, supra note 10, at 143-67.
In re Agent Orange, 603 F. Supp. 239 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
Harvey Berman, The Agent Orange Veteran Payment Program, 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 49, 50 (1990).
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years, as virtually every decision of the trial judge-including
the settlement plan, attorney fee awards and his granting
summary judgment on the "opt-out" claims-was appealed." 6
The first claim was not paid until 1989, a decade after the liti-
gation began.2
In July 1993, a panel of experts convened by the Institute
of Medicine concluded that there is sufficient evidence to link
exposure to Agent Orange to Hodgkin's disease and to a rare
liver disorder. Immediately after the release of the panel's
findings, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs announced that
Vietnam veterans suffering from these diseases would be eligi-
ble for special disability payments."
2. Asbestos
One of the most effective insulation materials, asbestos
was used for many years in numerous industrial settings, in
ships, in schools, and in homes across the country. 9 Consump-
tion grew steadily in the United States through World War II,
and peaked in 1974Y It is now known that inhalation of as-
bestos fibers "can cause asbestosis, lung cancer, and
mesothelioma. 1 Estimates of the ultimate health effects of as-
bestos are highly controversial, but there is little doubt that
exposure was widespread.232
Barred from suing their employers by the workers' com-
pensation exclusivity doctrine, asbestos workers turned to
asbestos manufacturers to compensate them for their injuries.
Successful product liability litigation against asbestos manu-
facturers is generally traced to the 1973 decision in Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., in which the Fifth Circuit
ruled that manufacturers could be held strictly liable for inju-
22G PETERSON & SELVIN, supra note 220, at 53.
Berman, supra note 225, at 56.
2' Marlene Cimons, VA Aid Ok'd for Two Diseases Tied to Agent Orange, L.A.
TIMES, July 28, 1993, at A18.
HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS, supra note 2, at 1.
' Hensler, Fashioning a Resolution, supra note 2, at 1973 (citing BARRY
CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS (2d ed. 1986)).
2' HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS, supra note 2, at 13-14.
" Hensler, Fashioning a Resolution, supra note 1, at 1973 (citing W. Nicholson
et al., Occupational Exposure to Asbestos: Population at Risk and Projected Mortal-
ity, 1980-2030, 3 AM. J. INDUST. MED. 259 (1982)).
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ries caused by asbestos exposure."3 Filings grew steadily
through the late 1970s, appeared to level off for a time, and
then surged anew in the late 1980s. By 1992, an estimated
200,000 asbestos personal injury claims, naming one to a dozen
defendants apiece, had been filed or were pending nationwide.
As a result of the litigation, some dozen or so asbestos manu-
facturers have sought the protection of the bankruptcy
courts. 4 Asbestos litigation has become the mass tort that
dwarfs all others.
Asbestos litigation has been concentrated in about one-
quarter of the states, primarily those that are coastal. Initially,
the courts in these states attempted to deal with asbestos
cases on an individualized basis. But as caseloads mounted,
courts turned increasingly to aggregative procedures, using an
array of informal and formal mechanisms for dispositions.
These efforts became more aggressive as courts used consolida-
tion and class actions to group, and then dispose of, thousands
of cases at a time in Texas, Virginia, Mississippi, West Virgin-
ia and Maryland.235
Until recently, no efforts were made to coordinate asbestos
litigation across different courts. Attempts at cbllecting federal
court cases under MDL were repeatedly rejected by the MDL
panel until 1991, when the panel transferred all federal cases
to Judge Charles Weiner of the Eastern District of Pennsylva-
nia."' In further efforts at coordination, state court judges
have recently begun meeting together."7
Increasingly, asbestos claims have been coordinated
through bankruptcy proceedings, which require valuation of
present and future asbestos claims against a bankrupt defen-
s Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
14 Hensler, Fashioning a Resolution, supra note 2, at 1970-72.
" In July 1993, after a trifurcated consolidated trial of 8500 cases against
eight defendants, a Baltimore jury found all but one company liable for selling a
defective product and awarded $11.2 million in compensatory damages to two
representative plaintiffs. In three other representative cases, the jury delivered
defense verdicts. The jury established punitive damage multipliers ranging between
.35 and 2.5 for the different defendants. The judge temporarily set aside the puni-
tive damage awards until all compensatory claims could be resolved, and the de-
fendants appealed the verdicts.
In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 1991).
Francis E. McGovern, The Boundaries of Cooperation Among Judges in Mass
Tort Litigation (1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors); see
Schwarzer et al., supra note 13.
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dant, along with all other claims, and then a reorganization
plan to compensate equitably all claims from the defendant's
assets. Typically these plans fund settlement trusts to resolve
all asbestos claims while reducing involvement in the tort
system. The first wave of bankruptcies in the early 1980s in-
volved Manville, UNARCO and several smaller companies.
Manville, the dominant asbestos manufacturer and primary
defendant, was the first major defendant to seek bankruptcy
protection because of its expected mass tort liabilities.
Manville's filing stayed its asbestos litigation, disrupted all
other asbestos litigation and created great controversy and
indignation. The reorganization plan confirmed in 1986 created
a $2.5 billion trust that owned almost 90 percent of Manville
Corporation and assured plaintiffs that they could continue to
litigate their claims in the tort system and would receive the
full value of their claims. These assurances quickly proved
false about a year after the Trust began to pay claims."'
Judge Jack B. Weinstein stayed payments by the Manville
Trust in July 1990 when it became apparent that the Trust
would soon run out of money and could pay present and future
claimants only ten percent of the value of their claims.239
Since November 1990 the Trust and its beneficiaries have
struggled to restructure the Trust's distribution process. A
second wave of bankruptcies occurred in the late 1980s and
early 1990s as one defendant after another was driven to insol-
vency by increasing numbers of claims, the massive exposure
associated with consolidated and class action claims and the
requirement to make up for the by-then-insolvent Manville's
share.
Some defendants who remained in the tort system formed
defense consortia in attempts to reduce their litigation costs
and to control their liabilities and access to insurance. The
Center for Claims Resolution ("CCR"), a consortium of twenty
small to moderate defendants has operated since 1988, follow-
ing the break-up of a larger consortium, the Asbestos Claims
Facility. In January 1993, the CCR agreed to settle a class
2" HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS, supra note 2, at 52-67 & 94-109;
Hensler, Fashioning a Solution, supra note 2, at 1974-76.
2 A recent expert panel appointed by Judge Weinstein estimated that as many
as 450,000 additional asbestos claims might be filed in the future.
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action of future claimants brought by several major asbestos
plaintiffs' lawyers." CCR members and most of their insur-
ers agreed to provide certain compensation for each of the next
ten years under procedures that would limit the number and
amount of payments each year, deny payments to claims that
do not meet specified medical and exposure requirements and
limit the number of future claimants who may enter the tort
system. The proposed settlement, which is now pending in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, has created angry divisions
within the asbestos plaintiffs' bar.
3. DDT: Triana, Alabama"4'
In 1979, approximately 1200 residents of Triana, Alabama,
filed suit against the Olin Corporation ("Olin"). The residents
alleged that Olin had dumped 400 tons of dichloro-diphenyl-
trichloro-ethane ("DDT"') into the Tennessee river. The DDT
settled to the bottom of the riverbed and was ingested by bot-
tom-feeding catfish, a staple of the Triana residents' diet. The
plaintiffs claimed that they had suffered personal injury and
property damage as a result of this exposure. In 1981, a settle-
ment was reached when Olin agreed to pay each plaintiff
$10,000, establish a health facility for the plaintiffs and clean
up the site over the next five years.
From January to December 1983, over 10,000 additional
residents from the surrounding areas filed suit against Olin,
the Tennessee Valley Authority and the U.S. Department of
the Army. The actions were consolidated in federal court and a
special master was appointed to manage pretrial discovery. In
1984, a discovery plan was implemented which divided the
litigation into three separate pretrial tracks. The first track
involved general discovery about the individual background
and medical history of each plaintiff, the second track was an
in-depth discovery of twenty randomly selected plaintiffs, and
the third track was reserved for the adjudication of pretrial
legal issues.
24' Frederick M. Baron, An Asbestos Settlement With a Hidden Agenda, WALL
ST. J., May 6, 1993, at All.
241 This summary is based upon Francis E. McGovern, The Alabama DDT
Settlement Fund, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61 (1990).
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In May 1986, one month before trial, the parties agreed to
a $15 million settlement to be paid over the next two years. By
October 1986, the total settlement class numbered more than
13,000 residents. The $15 million was placed in a settlement
fund and was used to pay attorneys' fees, court costs, adminis-
trative costs and to compensate the plaintiff class members.
The court appointed an administrator to oversee the fund dis-
tribution and a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of
the plaintiff class. The settlement provided that compensation
would be paid only to members of the settlement class who (1)
had a high blood toxicity level of DDT; (2) manifested certain
illnesses; (3) resided in close proximity to the Redstone Arse-
nal; and (4) sustained losses related to exposure to Olin DDT.
The fund paid for the requisite blood serum tests for the
class members. The compensation schedule ranged from $7500
for hypertension claims, to $10,000 - $60,000 for cancer claims
(liver tumor, lung lymphoma, follicular cell and ovarian can-
cer). Plaintiffs received additional compensation for elevated
levels of DDT and specific harms. Ultimately, 9415 plaintiffs
were qualified to receive compensation from the fund.
4. Lead
Exposure to lead can stunt the growth of a child's brain
and central nervous system. Lead-poisoned children are alleged
to have attention-span deficits, to suffer from hyperactivity and
to have problems with speech and language processing. Lead is
present in old lead-based paint, plumbing, plaster, old furni-
ture, toys, eating utensils, soldering fumes, soil and drinking
water.
2 42
Lead poisoning has been called the number one environ-
mental threat to children, with accessible lead paint in up to
forty-two million homes and apartments housing over twelve
million children. In older Eastern cities such as New York,
Boston and Philadelphia, an estimated sixty to eighty percent
of housing units may be contaminated. Although most uses of
lead-based paint were banned in 1977, lead water pipes and
22 Cameron F. Kerry, Lead Poisoning Claims, Awards Are Multiplying, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER, PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS MGiTS. ED., Sept. 21, 1992, at
82.
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solder were not restricted until 1986. The EPA estimates ten to
twenty percent of lead poisoning is caused by drinking water.
A 1988 report to Congress estimated that 17% or 2.4 million
preschool children have more than 15 micrograms per deciliter
of lead in their blood. The Center for Disease Control classifies
lead poisoning as more than ten micrograms of lead per decili-
ter.
243
Because lead poisoning occurs over long time periods and
may be caused by many different environmental sources, a
lead poisoned plaintiff may have difficulty pinpointing and
proving the source(s) of the lead exposure.' In Massachu-
setts, a lead paint statute subjects current owners of buildings
with accessible lead-based materials to strict liability if a child
tenant contracts lead poisoning."
Suits alleging injuries to children due to lead paint have
been brought against numerous municipal housing authorities.
For example, in March 1991, a class action suit was filed on
behalf of children in Newark, New Jersey against landlords,
the City of Newark, and various city agencies.246 In addition,
under the theories of enterprise and market share liability,
municipal agencies, in turn, have brought paint manufacturers
into such litigations. In May 1989, the Housing Authority of
New Orleans and its insurance companies, facing 87 lawsuits
on behalf of 105 children, successfully joined 17 lead-based
pigment manufacturers as third-party defendants (pigment is
the lead-containing substance in paint).24v The Housing Au-
thority had previously settled one case for $80,000, one for
$75,000, one for $25,000 and 20 cases for $1500 to $15,000
each.24 In September 1992, the Louisiana Court of Appeal
ruled that this suit could proceed and declined to take a posi-
24 Owen P. MacGowan, Deflecting Liability in Lead-Poisoning Suits, 93 BEST'S
REVIEW: PROPERTY-CASUALTY INS. ED., Feb. 1993, at 62.
2 Id. In 1977, Congress passed the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Act which
requires lead removal from buildings subject to federal control and notice to ten-
ants about possible dangers. Many states and cities have passed similar laws
which apply to private landlords. Id.
245 Id.
246 See Andrew Blum, Lead Paint Litigation Mushrooms, NATL L.J., Nov. 4,
1991, at 3 (citing case).
247 See Andrew Blum, Suit Targets Paint Manufacturers; New Orleans Case a
Message?, NAT'L L.J., May 8, 1989, at 17.
248 Id.
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tion on the applicability of the market share theory of liabili-
ty.24
9
Other classes of plaintiffs have sued paint manufacturers
directly. For example, in July 1991, a class-action suit was
filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on behalf of
21,000 painters.25 The suit named nineteen defendants, in-
cluding the Lead Industries Association, manufacturers of lead
pigment and paint producers."
To date, parties generally have not been successful in
pursuing lead pigment and paint manufacturers under the
enterprise liability theory. In Santiago v. Sherwin-
Williams,22 a district court judge held that a plaintiff who
was injured by ingesting lead paint and who could not identify
the responsible paint manufacturer may not recover damages
for negligent design, failure to warn, breach of warranty or
concert of action from paint manufacturers based on a market
share or enterprise theory of liability." Similarly, in City of
Philadelphia v. Lead Industries Association," another dis-
trict court judge ruled that a market share theory of liability
was not available under Pennsylvania law.' Philadelphia
had sought class-action status on behalf of cities with popula-
tions over 100,000 and argued that lead paint manufacturers
should be held liable based upon their market share as there is
no way to determine which manufacturer supplied the paint
for most public buildings.25 This decision was followed in
Hurt v. Philadelphia Housing Authority,257 where District
Judge James Giles refused to allow the plaintiffs to pursue
claims against lead pigment manufacturers under a market
29 New Orleans Lead Paint Case Can Proceed, ASBESTOS ABATEMENT REP.,
Sept. 25, 1992, at 5.
2.. David Prinzinsky, Lead Paint Makers Face Mounting Litigation, UMI DATA
COURIER, July 15, 1991, at 1.
2. Swartzbauer v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 91-3948 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 1992).
22 794 F. Supp. 29 (D. Mass. 1992), affd, 3 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1993); see The
Most Important Opinions of 1992; Products Liability, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Jan. 18,
1993, at S1l.
' Santiago, 794 F. Supp. at 33-34.
2.. No. CIVA.90-7064, 1992 WL 98482 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 1992), affd, 994 F.2d
112 (3d Cir. 1993).
25 Philadelphia Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Against Lead Paint Pigment Makers,
ASBESTOS ABATEMENT REP., May 28, 1992.
Lead Paint Makers Not Liable, BUS. INS., May 4, 1992, at 50.
257 806 F. Supp. 515 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
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share or other collective liability theory."
Finally, in Swartzbauer v. Lead Industries Association,.9
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held
that a class action suit by painters and their spouses against
lead pigment manufacturers and paint makers, and the Lead
Industry Association could proceed only under traditional tort
theories.26 The court refused to allow the plaintiffs to pro-
ceed under the theories of enterprise liability, alternative lia-
bility or market share. The court found that these three theo-
ries of collective liability are not applicable in circumstances
where the identity of the product manufacturer is not at is-
sue.
2 6 1
E. Electro-Magnetic Radiation ("EMR")
Claims that non-ionizing, electro-magnetic radiation may
be a health hazard have been made for some time. Studies
conducted in the 1960s in the Soviet Union reportedly showed
a statistical link between electric fields and chronic disorders
such as headaches, fatigue, nausea and loss of sexual appetite.
Since 1979, other studies have claimed to show a link between
magnetic fields from local power lines and childhood cancer.
Although these claims have been received with skepticism in
Europe, the electricity industry in the United States has taken
them seriously and major domestic utilities have committed
$30 million to a five-year research project to determine the
effects of EMR. The Edison Electrical Institute ("EE"), the
trade association that represents privately-owned utilities,
rates future liability issues raised by EMR as the top concern
for its chief executives. In 1991, the majority of the scientific
community believed that there were only marginal health risks
associated with exposure to EMR. In 1989, however, the Con-
gressional Office of Technology ("OTA") reported that EMR
effects on human health could not be dismissed entirely and
recommended "prudent avoidance" of EMR to minimize possi-
ble health risks.262
" Good News for Lead Industry is Bad News for Public Housing, PR
NEWSWIRE, Aug. 28, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File.
"9 No. 91-3948, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4868 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 1992).
21 Product Safety and Liability, 61 U.S.L.W. 2080 (Aug. 11, 1992).
261 Id.
262 See EMF: A Major Headache, FIN. TIMES ENERGY ECONOMIST, June 1991.
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As a result of this uncertainty, legislators in nine states
(California, Washington, Oregon, Illinois, Michigan, Tennessee,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut) have introduced
EMR bills, recommending further research funded by utilities,
safety measures and moratoria on new transmission lines.
Moreover, there has been growing opposition to the building of
new transmission lines from the public.26 In addition, com-
puter manufacturers are now advertising "low radiation"
equipment.2"
A number of EMR lawsuits have been filed, many involv-
ing police officers who claim to have contracted cancer from the
use of radar guns. In 1990, Boeing settled a personal injury
suit for $500,000 in which the plaintiff claimed to have been
treated as a human guinea pig and to have contracted leuke-
mia from exposure to electro-magnetic pulse ("EMP") radiation
at the Lovelace Biomedical and Environmental Research Insti-
tute in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Boeing agreed to pay
$200,000 to fund 10 years of independent medical monitoring
for the plaintiff and the 700 other employees who had been
exposed to the radiation. Although the EMP radiation involved
in the suit differs from the EMR fields generated by appliances
and power lines, plaintiffs' attorneys viewed the settlement as
a ground-breaking case.265
In March 1992, the National Radiological Protection Board
reported that it had found no link between disease and low
level EMR from television sets, microwave ovens and computer
screens. The Board stressed, however, that more research is
needed into the effects of low level EMR from electrical equip-
ment, including mobile phones and short-wave radios.266 In
This report coincided with a series of New Yorker articles by Paul Brodeur (author
of an earlier investigatory report on asbestos), entitled "Annals of Radiation," in
which he argued that the health risks were real and that there has been a sys-
tematic government cover-up.
" In response to such concerns, the utility companies usually send out "rep-
resentatives to measure fields in people's homes" and to show them that the fields
generated by home appliances are generally higher than those generated by high
voltage transmission lines. A representative from the Office of Radiation Programs
at the Environmental Protection Agency says that public concern about EMR has
"spread . . . faster than any other issue he has seen." Id.
2" Id.
2G5 Id.
2E6 Amanda Brown, Radiation Report Limits Cancer Threat, PRESS ASSN
NEWSFILE, Mar. 31, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PANEWS File.
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October 1992, a Danish cancer board study found that there
was an apparent level of higher lymphatic cancer among chil-
dren living twenty-five to fifty meters from power lines but
that there was not a higher incidence of leukemia or brain
tumors among these children.267 In August 5, 1992, the Na-
tional Radiological Protection Board announced that it is man-
aging a three-year project to examine EMR effects of mobile
telephones.26 In November 1992, the Institute of Environ-
mental Medicine of the Karolinska Institute in Stockholm
reported that a study had found an increased incidence of some
types of cancer in people who live near high voltage electricity
lines. The study followed 436,500 people who had lived within
300 meters of high voltage lines for at least a year and report-
ed an increased rate of rare childhood leukemia.269
In January 1993, a man who appeared on CNN's Larry
King Live television show claimed that his thirty-three year old
wife had contracted brain cancer from using a cellular phone.
Within a week, the stock price of Motorola, Inc., the biggest
maker of cellular phones dropped twenty percent and several
newspaper articles discussed the suspected link between cellu-
lar phones and brain tumors. On January 30, 1993, the
Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association announced
that it will spend over one million dollars for new research into
the safety of the phones. The industry group asked three feder-
al government agencies-the Federal Communications Com-
mission, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services-to appoint a panel of
scientists to investigate the safety of the phones. 1 There are
more than ten million cellular phone subscribers in the United
States.272 On February 3, 1993, the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration ("FDA") announced to Congress that it would soon
issue an advisory on cellular phones and the effects of low-level
21 Cable Fears Erupt in Denmark, FIN. TIMES LTD., Oct. 16, 1992.
2" Mobile Phone Radiation Check, PRESS ASs'N NEWSFILE, Aug. 5, 1992, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PANEWS File.
269 Study Reports Increased Incidence of Cancer Near High Voltage Lines, FIN.
TIMES LTD., Nov. 6, 1992.
27 Howard Fineman, The Power of Talk, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 8, 1993, at 24.
271 Carla Lazzareschi, Call for Concern: Cellular Group Endorses New Research
on Phone Radiation, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1993, at 1.
272 Id.
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EMR. The FDA stated that the advisory will caution customers
against excessive use of cellular phones and unnecessary expo-
sure to the devices' antennas."3 Mays Swycord, the chief of
the FDA's radiation biology branch told a House energy and
commerce subcommittee that there is no proven cancer threat
from the phones but that preliminary research suggests a link
between cancer and microwave radiation. The same day, users
of cellular phones filed a class-action suit against Motorola
Inc., and Mitsubishi Electronics Corp., alleging that the manu-
facturers failed to test the phones for potentially dangerous
radio waves and failed to warn phone users that they might be
exposed to harmful or lethal doses of radio waves." 4
III. WHAT EXPLAINS THE EMERGENCE OF MASS INJURY
LITIGATION IN THE 1980s?
The emergence of mass personal injury litigation in the
1980s was a consequence of the interaction of diverse social
and legal trends. Mass marketing of products increased the
population's exposure to potentially injurious products and
substances. Mass injuries created a need for compensation for
medical expense and work loss, which is not universally avail-
able in the United States."7 Medical researchers became
more adept at detecting links between injury and product use
or exposure to chemical substances. Mass media became more
attentive to consumer and environmental safety issues and
more prone to publicizing alleged links between products and
injuries. Plaintiffs' lawyers gained permission to advertise
their availability to represent claims and became more asser-
tive in seeking out potential victims of mass injuries. More
importantly, legal rules and procedures became more favorable
to plaintiffs seeking compensation from product manufacturers.
Many of these trends began decades ago, but the pace of
change seemed to quicken after 1960.76 Now, multiple as-
,3 Carla Lazzareschi, FDA to Call for Cautious Cellular Use, LA. TIMES, Feb.
3, 1993, at 1.
274 Id.
27 See, e.g., DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURY
IN THE UNITED STATES (1991).
171 In his article considering the possible end of the expansion of modern tort
doctrine, Gary Schwartz argues that changes in products liability doctrine were, in
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pects of American culture and the legal system combine to
create a high potential for continuing mass personal injury
litigation. In this section, we discuss the factors that contribute
to mass injuries, the social forces that encourage mass injury
victims to pursue legal claims for compensation and the sub-
stantive and procedural rules that facilitate mass tort litiga-
tion.
A. Factors Contributing to Mass Injuries
Catastrophic events provide the most vivid examples of
mass injuries that can result in mass tort litigation. The
Beverly Hills Supper Club fire, the Hyatt Skywalk building
collapse and the MGM-Grand Hotel and DuPont Plaza Hotel
fires all resulted in many serious or fatal injuries, followed by
mass litigation."' But, as a practical matter, mass personal
injury litigation resulting from these sorts of catastrophes is
inherently limited, because it cannot expand too far beyond
persons who were present at the time of the event. As shown
in Figure 1, mass injury litigation resulting from past cata-
strophic events has rarely involved more than a thousand
claims and more typically has been limited to a few hundred
claims or less. As a result, many mass tort practitioners regard
such litigation -as less problematic than the much more mas-
sive litigation that has resulted from widespread use of defec-
tive products."8
part, a consequence of changes in social and political attitudes, including the rise
of the consumer and environmental movements. See generally Gary T. Schwartz,
The Beginning and the Possible End of The Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26
GA. L. REV. 601, 605-20 (1992).
2' See supra notes 29-70 and accompanying text.
2. However, as societies gain the ability to build and equip structures for ever
more intensive use, we can expect future structural catastrophes to involve even
greater numbers of victims. For example, the World Trade Center in New York,
site of a recent terrorist bombing, is said to house about 50,000 workers, with an
additional 50,000 visitors passing through on a typical day. Subsequent to the
bombing, a class action suit was filed against the building owners and operators.
Moreover, the future may well hold more environmental catastrophes, such as
the accident that occurred at Bhopal, nuclear power plant accidents and oil spills.
Congress has established an administrative compensation scheme to deal with the
eventuality of a nuclear power plant disaster. To date, United States courts have
not had to deal with massive personal injury litigation as a result of these sorts
of disasters. The Exxon Valdez oil spill has resulted in massive litigation, but the
civil claims allege financial injury, rather than physical harm.
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The largest mass tort litigations have been those arising
from product use or exposure to a toxic substance (see Figure
1). Our modern economy rewards'manufacturers for capturing
large market shares, thereby creating a potential for exposing
millions of persons to products, some of which are found to be
dangerous after they are put on the market. More than thirty
million pregnant women used BendectinY 9 An estimated
four to six million Americans (women and their offspring) were
exposed to DES during pregnancy."' Over four million
Dalkon Shields were distributed worldwide, and at least 2.2
million American women used them.28' More than two mil-
lion women have silicone breast implants.282 Tens of millions
of American workers were exposed to asbestos on their
jobs.8 3 When so many persons are exposed, even very rare
injuries can produce thousands of claims.
Few types of products, however, have such a potential for
mass liability. Particularly in a consumer-conscious society
with a vigilant press, if a product causes obvious and signifi-
cant harm to even a few of its users, the manufacturer will
quickly take it off the market in order to protect its brand
name and reputation. For example, when several fatalities
occurred as a result of product tampering, Johnson & Johnson
promptly removed Tylenol capsules from the market and rede-
signed the packaging for all of its products." In the more
typical examples of food contamination, companies or public
health agencies move swiftly when harm is detected, removing
a suspect product from shelves. Regulators quickly contained
the food poisoning from salmonella in milk distributed by Jew-
el Foods in Chicago285 and, more recently, from e-coli contam-
27 Nosacka, supra note 75, at 231.
29 See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
291 MINTZ, supra note 113, at 5.
.2 Frankel, supra note 158, at 85.
CASTLEMAN, supra note 230.
2U Survivors of victims of the product tampering sued Johnson & Johnson
claiming that the manufacturer should have taken measures to prevent the tam-
pering. A New York wrongful death case resulted in a summary judgment for the
defendants, and an Illinois case involving 22 claimants was settled for more than
$35 million. See Andrew Blum, Headache Lingers: Tylenol Death Litigation Still
Lacks an Antidote, NAT'L L.J., July 30, 1990, at 1; P. Davis Szymczak, Settlement
Reached in Tylenol Suit, CHI. TRIB., May 14, 1991, at 1.
211 Salmonella Outbreak Traced, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1993, at C6.
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inated hamburgers sold by Jack-in-the-Box, 2 ' by withdraw-
ing the contaminated products after the risks were publicized.
The Chicago salmonella contamination resulted in mass litiga-
tion, but the number of claims against Jack-in-the-Box was
limited to the relatively few consumers who were exposed to
the product before the harm was detected.
The potential for truly massive product liability litigation
occurs only when the harm is not obvious and goes undetected
or unreported for long periods, even years, while the exposed
population continues to expand. There are a number of reasons
why this might occur. First, as with asbestos-related injuries,
the injury may be latent with no manifestation for years after
initial exposure. Also, the rate of injury may be relatively mod-
est, affecting only a small percentage of users. Under such
circumstances, the link between exposure and injury will be-
come apparent only after many individuals have been ex-
posed-and then only if the requisite clinical research is under-
taken. For most of the products that have spawned mass litiga-
tion to date, the plaintiffs charge that the products have
heightened the risk of one or more diseases, but not that there
exists a one-to-one relationship between use or exposure and
injury.
Another factor resulting in undetected harm is that the
injury linked to exposure may have other alternative explana-
tions that obscure the relationship between the product and
the diseases it allegedly causes. For example, lung cancer
caused by asbestos exposure cannot be distinguished from lung
cancer caused by smoking and a variety of other environmental
exposures. Similarly, the increased incidence of pelvic inflam-
matory disease caused by the Dalkon Shield was obscured by
the general increase in the disease as sexual practices changed
in the 1970s.
In addition, the attention of medical researchers and law-
yers may not be engaged if injuries caused by a product are
not extraordinarily serious. The dangers of asbestos and the
Dalkon Shield were first identified not through the great num-
bers of breathing impairments or pelvic infections that they
caused, but only after the medical community became con-
cerned about life-threatening cancers associated with asbestos
"f Jack in Box Parent Posts Record Profit, LA. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1993, at D1.
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exposure'17 and about septic abortions associated with the
Shield.288 Moreover, for many products there is no mecha-
nism for comprehensive, ongoing monitoring of product safety.
Even for drugs, which are subjected to the most stringent mon-
itoring of marketed products, it is clinicians who ordinarily
detect the link between the harm and product usage. Such
harms may not be recognized until many people have been
exposed. Manufacturers may contribute to the problem as well.
The history of mass torts has shown that manufacturers may
doubt or at times even suppress information about potential
product-related dangers, allowing products to remain on the
market until their dangers are obvious and many people have
been placed at risk.289
Finally, weaknesses in the regulatory process have contrib-
uted to the incidence of mass injuries, particularly those asso-
ciated with medical devices and occupational hazards. As
shown in Figure 1, medical devices are well represented in
mass tort litigation. This is not surprising. Medical products
that are widely used and that remain in the bodies of many
users for long periods of time have a particularly great risk of
resulting in substantial numbers of injuries. But, until recent-
ly, medical devices were subject to little review for safety by
the FDA.29
Indeed, the new drug application procedure that existed in
the early 1970s played a crucial role in Robins' ill-fated deci-
sion to market the Dalkon Shield. Although the law required a
" Irving Selikoff et al., Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia, 188 JAMA 22 (1964).
2 Mintz, supra note 71.
28 Failure to report product problems and to withdraw allegedly faulty products
from the market were at the heart of the Dalkon Shield and Shiley Heart Valve
litigations. See MINTZ, supra note 113; Stewart, supra note 144, at A3 (citing re-
port of the U.S. House Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee finding that
Shiley had failed to report critical heart valve failures during early marketing to
the FDA, and later delayed giving safety-related information to the FDA).
" Although the FDA regulates pharmaceutical safety, prior to 1976, it did not
regulate medical devices. Under the 1976 amendments to the Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act, all new medical devices became subject to review, but reviews of
devices already on the market were permitted to be phased in as the FDA was
able to conduct them. In 1990, the U.S. House Oversight and Investigation Sub-
committee found that the FDA's regulation of the Shiley Heart Valve had raised
"serious questions about the FDA's willingness and ability . . . to protect public
health when faced with companies that profit from the manufacture and sale of
medical devices." See Stewart, supra note 144, at A3.
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manufacturer who desired to market a new prescription drug
to file a new drug application documenting that the safety of
the product had been established through animal and clinical
testing, there was no testing requirement for a medical device
such as the Dalkon Shield. Under the law, the FDA could halt
sales of a device only after the product had caused injury or
death. Accordingly, Robins placed the Dalkon Shield on the
market without testing it for safety in either animals or clini-
cal studies. Hugh Davis, inventor and part owner of the Shield,
had studied its safety and effectiveness, but during the course
of the Shield litigation, it was revealed that Davis had falsified
the results of his study, including the 1.1% pregnancy rate that
Robins touted in its advertisements for the Shield. If Robins
had been required to go through the same procedure for the
Shield as required for a new prescription drug, Robins would
have been required to monitor 1500 to 2000 users for two
years. The FDA then would have decided whether the Shield
was a safe product after studying the results. Instead, the
medical device loophole in the law allowed Robins to put an
untested product on the market.2
Asbestos litigation is another example of the costs of fail-
ing to regulate exposure to dangerous substances. The risks of
asbestos had been known for many years, but because of oppo-
sition from asbestos manufacturers, strict regulations of
workplace exposure to asbestos were not imposed until the
1960s. 2  Similarly, applying aircraft flame retardance stan-
dards to public structures such as hotels might have lessened
the extent of injuries and the scope of litigation in the MGM
Grand and DuPont Plaza Hotel fires. 3
291 MINTrZ, supra note 113, at 115. Spurred by the Dalkon Shield litigation,
Congress adopted the Medical Device Amendments in 1976, which closed this loop-
hole.
29 PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MIsCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRI-
AL (1985).
Strengthening regulatory standards and implementation, of course, would not
eliminate mass injuries. Some latent injury risks may, indeed, be unknowable at
the time a product is marketed, so that no degree of regulation would eliminate
risk of injury, short of not marketing the product at all. But the failure to market
any product that might cause latent injury would keep many socially beneficial
products off the market. In addition, the direct and indirect costs of such over-
regulation would be debilitatingly high.
Litigation and regulation represent alternative strategies for enhancing the
safety of products. Ideally, litigation should impose costs only on dangerous prod-
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While this discussion has considered the many factors
contributing to undetected harm, the converse phenomenon is
also possible: large numbers of injuries may occur and appear
to be linked to product use or exposure when an exposed popu-
lation is subject to injuries from other sources. Many regarded
the litigation that arose over Bendectin, the anti-nausea drug
marketed to pregnant women,' 9' as a classic example of this
"false positive" problem.
B. Factors Facilitating Claiming
Mass injuries, by themselves, do not produce mass tort
litigation. For litigation to arise, injured individuals must: (1)
believe that their injuries were caused by either their presence
at a catastrophic event or their product use or exposure-or at
least that the courts can be persuaded that this is the case; (2)
believe that someone associated with the catastrophe or prod-
uct can and should be held responsible for compensating them
for their losses; and (3) know how to obtain legal representa-
tion and succeed in doing so. Contrary to contemporary por-
trayals of Americans as overly litigious, only a small fraction of
injured individuals move through all three of these steps.
A recent Institute for Civil Justice study found that fewer
than one in five injured Americans even considered the possi-
bility of obtaining compensation from others for their acciden-
tal injuries. Only one in ten took any action to attempt to ob-
tain such compensation. Only about one third of these or less
than three percent of all injured persons filed a liability law-
suit."5 A primary factor explaining these low rates of claim-
ing is an individuals' tendency to attribute causation and
blame for their injuries to themselves or natural forces. 96
A variety of economic and social factors influence whether
or not an injured person will file a lawsuit: the availability of
other sources of compensation, media and advertising, the
experience and recommendations of friends, suggestions by
unions and health care providers and the ability to locate legal
ucts, while regulation imposes costs on all products.
2. See supra notes 75-93 and accompanying text.
Z HENSLER ET AL., supra note 275, at 122.
2 Id. at 163-64.
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counsel. In recent years these social influences have facilitated
the filing of mass tort claims.
1. Mass media
Although there has been widespread speculation that in-
creased media coverage of health-related risks has led to in-
creased risk aversion on the part of Americans, a new empiri-
cal analysis of print and broadcast media suggests that the
absolute number of news stories about health hazards and
hazardous events is no higher now than in the 1960s.297 But
the stories themselves have changed. Over the past twenty-five
years, there has been a dramatic shift in news media atten-
tion, from accidents, such as airplane crashes, train derail-
ments and fires to product-related risks, especially environ-
mental exposure to harmful chemicals."8 The mass media
are particularly likely to report harms involving multiple
deaths from a single "event." Moreover, news stories about
product and substance-related hazards are more likely now
than in the past to attribute blame for such hazards to busi-
ness and industry. 9 Finally, the percentage of stories about
product and substance-related hazards that mention litigation
is now much higher than in the past."' In sum, by compari-
217 ELEANOR SINGER & PHYLLIS ENDRENY, REPORTING ON RISK: How THE MEDIA
PORTRAY ACCIDENTS, DISEASES, DISASTERS, AND OTHER HAZARDS (1993).
" Id. at 47. In their systematic analysis of newspaper and broadcast media
coverage of "hazards," Singer and Endreny found that, whereas in 1960, 63% of
such stories dealt with accidents and 6% with nuclear energy, chemicals, asbestos
and other "materials" hazards, by 1984, the proportion of stories on accidents had
dropped to 33%, and the proportion of stories related to materials hazards had in-
creased to 28% They concluded:
The huge shift from concern over [accidents], which pose immediate risks
to their victims, to concern over materials hazards, especially contamina-
tion of the environment by chemical pollutants that do much of their
damage over the long run ...does represent a long-term societal trend.
The big news about hazards in the eighties was news about environmen-
tal hazards assumed to be capable of causing illness and death in the fu-
ture . ...
Id.
2 Id. at 110. In 1960, only 56% of such stories attributed blame to business
and industry, compared to 73% in 1984. During the same period, the rate of blam-
ing industry for transportation accidents rose from 4% to 41%.
"o Id. at 123. The percentage of stories mentioning litigation rose from 4% in
1960 to 41% in 1984. The percentage of such stories mentioning regulation 38%
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son with twenty-five years ago, Americans are now more likely
to be exposed to information through the mass media that sug-
gests or establishes causal links between injuries and product
use or exposure, attributes blame for such hazards to business
or industry and provides information about the potential for
litigation-all of which are critical to establishing a claim. As a
result, individuals injured in "mass injury" circumstances may
receive more support for claiming than in the past.
Indeed, the mass media have played a key role in several
of the mass torts profiled above, both by informing injured
individuals of possible causal links between their injuries and
product use or exposure and by informing them of the exis-
tence and course of litigation. For example, the early develop-
ment of the Bendectin litigation followed an article in the Na-
tional Enquirer. In addition, the Dalkon Shield litigation arose
after much media exposure. Articles in womens' magazines
informed readers first of concerns and, then later, of verifica-
tion of the dangers of the Dalkon Shield."' An April 1981
segment of 60 Minutes on the "disaster of the Dalkon Shield"
may have informed a significant number of women both that
the Shield was a potentially deadly device and also that they
might have a claim against Robins for any injuries resulting
from its use. Another 60 Minutes segment in 1984 criticized
Robins for its failure to recall the Dalkon Shield. And within a
month, in September 1984, there were news reports of three
additional deaths related to the Dalkon Shield. Finally, Robins
began an advertising campaign to urge women to remove the
Shield and offered to pay for the cost of removal. The number
of Dalkon Shield claims rose during this period of media atten-
tion. Although Robins acknowledged no direct link between the
removal campaign and the negative publicity generated by the
60 Minutes segment, arguably the decision to begin a removal
campaign may have been spurred by negative press and a
desire to salvage what was left of its once enviable reputa-
tion.30
2
As the Dalkon Shield events illustrate, advertising may
was unchanged between the two time periods.
'3 Elizabeth Newman & Laura Fry, The Dalkon Shield and Women's Litigation
(1990) (unpublished student paper on file with the authors).
302 SOBOL, supra note 22, at 22-23.
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also play a significant role in mass tort litigation. The bank-
ruptcy court recognized the power of the media when it re-
quired Robins to provide notice of the bankruptcy bar date to
Shield users in eighty countries." 3 Robins complied with the
order by launching a world-wide advertising campaign which
resulted in over 300,000 claims being filed against Robins." 4
There are other examples as well. Print and electronic
media in the early 1980s widely reported apparent dangers
from Agent Orange and its contaminant, dioxin, and their
relation to Vietnam veterans' physical and emotional problems.
Injuries from the esoteric health food supplement L-tryptophan
received sustained national news coverage. More recently,
widespread publicity about successful litigation and regulatory
action concerning silicone breast implants have contributed to
a surge of breast implant litigation nationwide.0 '
Once begun, litigation events generate their own publicity,
which can affect the course of the litigation. Media reports of
substantial plaintiffs' verdicts can generate additional claims,
as seen in the National Enquirer articles on the first Bendectin
trial or news coverage of a $7.3 million verdict in a breast
implant trial.0 6 On the other hand, news of defense victories,
such as in two, well-publicized cigarette lung cancer
claims,0 ' can suppress claims by others. At times the media
seems to be the battle ground on which the course of a mass
tort is fought. For example, General Motors blunted adverse
publicity from a $105.2 million verdict in a truck fire case0 .
by undertaking a highly publicized attack on a misleading
0 BACIGAL, supra note 117, at 36.
o Id. at 99. Of the 300,000 claims filed, about one-third were deemed ineligi-
ble.
... Frankel, supra note 158, reports that Marianne Hopkins, who was awarded
$7.3 million by a San Francisco jury for injuries associated with silicone breast
implants, discovered the link between implants and her injuries from watching
local news coverage of the FDA panel review of implant safety. According to
Frankel, "[t]o Hopkins, it was a revelation. 'I thought I was the only person that
had problems with my implants,' she said." Id. at 84; see also Josephine Marcotty,
Implant Lawsuits: Flood of Litigation Possible Because of Health Problems with
Silicone Gel, MINN. STAR TRIB., Jan. 30, 1992, at ID.
0 Marcotty, supra note 305, at ID.
3o For a discussion of recent tobacco litigation, see Gary Schwartz, Tobacco
Liability in the Courts, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE (Robert
Robin & Stephen Sugarman eds., 1993).
" Moseley v. General Motors Corp., No. 90-V-6276 (Fulton Co. Ga. 1993).
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television news story showing fires in GM trucks."9 The sub-
stantial monetary award could have increased similar claims,
but GM's aggressive counterattack directed media attention
away from the verdict, possibly limiting its damage.
2. Social networks
Organizations and social contacts also play key roles in
leading injured persons to participate in mass litigation, by
informing them of possible compensation, directing them to
lawyers and encouraging and facilitating their claims. Existing
social organizations, such as labor unions, may become cata-
lysts for litigation, if they believe that their members have
been wrongfully injured. Ad hoc organizations of self-identified
victims may spring up after litigation has been initiated by
individuals, to serve as support groups for litigants and con-
duits for information.
Labor unions have been critical to developing mass tort
litigation arising from work place injuries. Both local and na-
tional unions worked with medical researchers to develop in-
formation about the link between asbestos exposure and malig-
nant and nonmalignant respiratory diseases.31 ° As the asbes-
tos litigation continued, unions participated in programs to
screen members for disease and referred members to experi-
enced plaintiffs' lawyers.3 ' Vietnam veterans' groups simi-
larly played a key role in initiating the Agent Orange litigation
and in encouraging veterans to participate. These groups vigor-
ously pursued arguments that illnesses among returning ser-
vicemen were linked to exposure to Agent Orange, informed
veterans of possible links between exposure to Agent Orange
and their health problems and sought out lawyers to represent
veterans." 2 Women's groups appear to have played a less im-
"' James C. Goodale, The Libel Suit That Never Was, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 8, 1993,
at 17-19; see also James B. Treece et al., Now the Court of Public Opinion Has
GM Worried, Bus. WK., Feb. 22, 1993, at 38.
11o The epidemiological studies conducted by Irving Selikoff, which were critical
to establishing causation, were supported by the insulation workers' union. See
Selikoff et al., supra note 287, at 22; Irving Selikoff et al., The Occurrence of As-
bestosis among Insulation Workers in the United States, 132 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD.
OF SC. 139 (1965).
3" HENSLER ET AL, ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS, supra note 2, at 92.
3'2 SCHUCK, supra note 10, at 37-57.
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portant role in the various products-related litigations associat-
ed with injuries to women-Dalkon Shield, DES, Silicone
Breast Implants-than unions and veterans groups, although
media targeted at women did play a role in conveying informa-
tion about possible product-related risks. 13
Ad hoc groups, such as the Asbestos Victims of America,
the Dalkon Shield victims organizations 14 and the Silicone
Breast Implant organizations have played a more modest role
in mass personal injury litigation than pre-existing social orga-
nizations. Generally, ad hoc groups have provided both infor-
mation about the course of the litigation and emotional support
to actual and potential claimants, and they have written and
spoken out on the claimants' behalf. Although, to date, such
victims' groups have not played a significant role in shaping
the litigation, they may facilitate the growth of mass litigation
by continuing to direct media attention to the injuries underly-
ing the litigation and to the litigation itself.
3. Physician contacts
Physicians are potentially important sources of informa-
tion for injury victims about possible links between victims'
injuries and product use or exposure. Physicians also may
inform their patients about the possibility of suing for damag-
es, and even direct their patients to attorneys who can assist
with their cases. In the RAND study of accidental injuries,
twenty-nine percent of those who claimed damages from some
other person or entity, cited their physician as their most im-
portant source of advice on whether to claim."5 But histori-
cally, physicians do not appear to have played a key role in
facilitating mass personal injury litigation. Perhaps because of
their scientific training, or because they are reluctant to be-
lieve that a product they prescribed could be harmful, or even
because they are concerned about possible malpractice claims
against them, physicians have been slow to accept evidence of
313 See generally Newman & Fry, supra note 301.
'1' There were four Dalkon Shield victims' groups, the Dalkon Shield Informa-
tion Network, the Dalkon Shield Women's Support Group, the International
Dalkon Victims' Education Association and the Dalkon Shield Victims' Association.
Id. at 16-34.
311 HENSLER ET AL., supra note 275, at 168.
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causal links between patients' complaints and product use. For
example, before the Dalkon Shield's dangers became widely
known, many physicians either failed to diagnose clear symp-
toms of pelvic inflammatory disease among Dalkon Shield
users or discounted the possibility that infections were associ-
ated with patients' use of the IUD. Plastic surgeons have also
been reluctant to accept that women's complaints of ill health
might be linked to silicone breast implants.
Moreover, industrial physicians employed by manufactur-
ers have been criticized for deliberately withholding informa-
tion from workers about links between occupational exposure
to toxic substances and disease. 16 Evidence introduced in as-
bestos litigation shows that for years medical researchers and
medical journals suppressed information about the relationship
between asbestos exposure and workers' respiratory diseases.
Other evidence indicates that some company physicians delib-
erately withheld from diseased workers information about the
link between their respiratory diseases and their asbestos
exposure. 17
4. Plaintiff law firms
While mass media, social networks and physicians may
encourage individuals to identify links between product use or
exposure and their injuries and to attribute blame for injury to
product manufacturers, litigation requires linking injury vic-
tims to attorneys willing to represent them. In recent years,
plaintiffs' attorneys have facilitated this process by advertising
their availability to represent specific classes of claimants 18
and, at times, by aggressively seeking out such claimants. For
example, advertisements by lawyers seeking clients with sili-
cone breast implants and other new mass claims have ap-
316 See Ronald Motley & Susan Nial, A Critical Analysis of the Brickman Ad-
ministrative Proposal: Who Declared War on Asbestos Victims' Rights? 13 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1919 (1992).
.1. See generally BRODEUR, supra note 292.
318 The Supreme Court rejected prohibitions on lawyer advertising in Bates v.
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding that a state cannot prevent a
lawyer from advertising the availability of legal services). By 1984, local television
advertising by attorneys topped $28 million. Martha Middleton, TV Ad Spending
Shows Sharp Rise, NATL L.J., Mar. 25, 1985, at 3.
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peared in newspapers in major metropolitan areas nationwide
(see Figure 2).19 Many law firms that advertise serve only as
referring lawyers who sign up and then refer claims to experi-
enced law firms that specialize in representing mass tort
claimants, creating what might be thought of as an American
mass tort version of Great Britain's solicitor-barrister relation-
ship.
Plaintiffs' attorneys have enhanced their probability of
winning cases against manufacturers by combining their re-
sources, sharing information and coordinating strategic ac-
tions. For example, by 1992 (less than six months after the
$7.3 million award to Hopkins), under the aegis of the
plaintiffs' attorney-supported Public Citizen, more than 150
plaintiffs' attorneys had joined a breast implant "information
clearing-house. "Litigation groups," sponsored by The
American Trial Lawyers Association ("ATLA"), also provide a
mechanism for coordinating plaintiff efforts. For example,
litigation over L-tryptophan led to the formation of an ATLA
litigation group comprising 300 attorneys who pooled resources
to organize medical seminars, conduct legal research (including
research on jurisdictional issues related to suing Japanese
manufacturers), publish a monthly newsletter, locate medical
laboratories, maintain document depositories and retain medi-
cal and scientific experts. They also formed teams to depose
the manufacturer's scientists and participate in discovery with
foreign lawyers. Finally, the litigation group recruited a slate
of attorneys that was elected to serve as the MDL steering
committee.321
As these efforts have proved successful, plaintiffs' attor-
neys have become increasingly willing to take on new mass
torts, making it more likely that mass injury claimants will
succeed in finding attorneys willing to represent them.
... As early as 1980, Melvin Belli advertised in the SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE
for "help for epidemiological and statistical purposes" relating to a trial of
Bendectin plaintiffs in Florida. See Sanders, supra note 90, at 353, n.217.
2 Frankel, supra note 24, at 90.
.21 ATLA's L-Tryptophan Group Produces Model for National Litigation, ATLA
ADVO., Mar. 1993, at 11. On the role of litigation groups in mass tort litigation,
see Paul Rheingold, The Development of Litigation Groups, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
1 (1982) and David Ranii, How the Plaintiffs' Bar Shares Its Information, NATL
L.J., July 23, 1984, at 1.
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C. The Contribution of Substantive and Procedural Law
Plaintiffs' attorneys' willingness to represent mass tort
claimants depends, of course, on their assessment of the odds
of winning such cases. Over the past several decades, changes
in legal doctrine and procedure have increased these odds
considerably. Until the 1960s, consumers rarely sued and less
often won personal injury suits against product manufacturers.
But by the end of the 1970s, the almost universal spread of
strict liability enabled plaintiffs to recover without showing
manufacturers' negligence if a product carried inadequate
warnings or was defectively designed or manufactured. Al-
though legal scholars differ in their characterizations of this
doctrinal revolution, 22 the empirical evidence indicates that
both the number of product liability claims and plaintiffs' suc-
cess in those claims increased greatly through the mid-
1980s. 32
The explosion of mass tort litigation in the 1980s illustrat-
ed in Figure 1 could not have taken place were it not for this
revolution in product liability doctrine during the two prior
decades. Modern product liability law gave persons who suf-
fered mass injuries in circumstances other than catastrophic
accidents the opportunity to sue the same defendants, product
manufacturers. In the absence of modern product liability
doctrine, accident victims either could claim workers' compen-
sation from their employers (for workplace injuries) or could
sue their physicians for medical malpractice (for injuries due to
drugs and medical devices). Under either scenario, claims
would be dispersed among many different defendants, thereby
3 For a critical review of recent tort scholarship, see Schwartz, supra note 276.
Schwartz argues that negligence principles have continued to play an important
role in product liability law, despite doctrinal evolution. See also James Henderson
& Aaron Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection
of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263 (1991).
" On patterns of product liability filings in the federal courts, see TERENCE
DUNWORTH, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THE BUSINESS SECTOR: LITIGATION TRENDS IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS (1988), and Hensler, Reading the Tort Litigation Tea Leaves,
supra note 2, at 25-27. On trends in product liability awards, see MARK PETERSON,
CIVIL JURIES IN THE 1980S: TRENDS IN JURY TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN CALIFORNIA
AND COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS (1987); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Don't Kill
the Messenger 'Till You Read the Message: Products Liability Verdicts in Six Cali-
fornia Counties, 1970-1990, 16 JUS. SYS. J. 69 (1993).
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diluting their numerical power, obscuring their commonality
and mitigating interdependencies among case values-the
defining characteristics of mass torts. It was the opportunity
for multiple suits against a single or few manufacturers that
created the conditions for mass torts outside of the context of
catastrophic accidents.
Strict product liability was not the only legal doctrine that
supported the development of mass litigation. Liberal construc-
tion of statutes of limitations and, in some jurisdictions, special
statutes, enabled individuals to file claims for injuries associat-
ed with product exposure that began decades earlier."4 The
"market share liability" doctrine allowed some mass tort plain-
tiffs to recover even if they were unable to demonstrate which
of several companies' products caused their injury -- a likely
circumstance when injuries occur years before recognition of
the causal link between products and injuries. Another impor-
... For a discussion of the role of statutes of limitations in the evolution of
asbestos litigation, see HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS, supra note 1, at
37-41.
3 "Market share" liability was first adopted by the California Supreme Court
in Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980), a
class action suit brought on behalf of DES victims. Although the plaintiffs (daugh-
ters of women who had used DES during their pregnancies) could not identify the
manufacturers of the specific products associated with their injuries, the court held
that manufacturers could be held liable and assessed damages proportionate to
their share of the market for DES. Id. at 936-37. New York and other states fol-
lowed California's lead. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly, 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d
1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989). Although initially seen
as having broad implications for mass torts, see HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE
COURTS, supra note 2, at 43-44, courts have generally refused to apply market
share theory to asbestos litigation, see, e.g., Mullen v. Armstrong World Indus.,
246 Cal. Rptr. 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), childhood vaccine litigation, or to litigation
against paint manufacturers for lead poisoning. Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,
794 F. Supp. 29 (D. Mass. 1992), affd, 3 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1993); see also City of
Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 944 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1993) (action by city
against manufacturer of lead-based paint to recover costs of abatement). But some
more recent decisions have allowed plaintiffs to prove market share liability
against asbestos manufacturers, Wheeler v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 11 Cal. Rptr.
109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (products liability action against manufacturer of brake
pads made of asbestos); Thacker v. UNR Indus., 603 N.E.2d 449 (Ill. 1992) (suit
by widow of pipe coverer who died from lung cancer) and courts have split on the
applicability of market share liability to blood transfusion cases brought by HIV
victims. See, e.g., Kellar v. Cutter Labs., No. 88-14059 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 6 1989);
Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717 (Haw. 1991) (allowing recovery un-
der market share theory of liability). For a recent review of the state of market
share liability doctrine, see Debra L. Scammon & Mary Jane Sheffet, Market
Share Liability: An Analysis Since Sindell, 11 J. PUB. POL. MARKET. 1 (1992).
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tant change has been the judicial acceptance of "fear of' future
injuries as compensable damages, even in the absence of cur-
rent illness or impairment. For example, fear of cancer result-
ing from asbestos exposure or fear of heart failure resulting
from failure of the Shiley Heart Valve, may entitle a plaintiff
to damages,32 thus expanding the pool of potential mass tort
claimants from those with a current impairment that can be
linked to product use or exposure to (in principle) all those who
could document product usage or exposure. Liberal construc-
tion of "successor liability" doctrine assured the availability of
assets to compensate injured individuals' claims when the
ownership of product manufacturers had changed-as is par-
ticularly likely when products blamed for injuries were de-
signed and manufactured many years ago. Indeed, where a
product manufacturer has been acquired and its operations
merged into the acquiring business, the entire business as-
sumes liability for injuries, thereby increasing the pool of as-
sets available for compensation.2 7 In addition, courts have
often construed manufacturers' insurance contracts to maxi-
mize coverage available to compensate mass tort claimants.
Under the "triple trigger" theory, defendants can call on each
insurance policy in force from the time that a plaintiff was first
exposed to a product until the plaintiffs product-related dis-
ease manifests itself, again increasing the pool of assets avail-
able for compensation.2
In parallel with these doctrinal developments, there was
'an evolution of civil procedures which ultimately facilitated
mass tort litigation. By the early 1960s, federal judges had in
3 See supra text accompanying notes 142-57.
3 California courts repudiated the general rule that, after a good faith sale of
assets, a successor corporation is not liable for the obligations of the former corpo-
ration. Ray v. Alad Corp. 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977) (finding an exception for claims
of strict products liability). The ruling was later extended, see, e.g., Rawlings v.
D.M. Oliver, Inc., 159 Cal. Rptr. 119 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (holding the successor
corporation liable even when successor products are different from the earlier prod-
uct line), and applied to DES in Maloney v. American Pharm. Co., 255 Cal. Rptr.
1 (Ct. App. 1988) (affirming the applicability of the doctrine but declining to hold
successor corporation liable on the facts before it).
3. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1050 (D.C. Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982). For a discussion of the evolution of court
doctrine on insurance coverage in the related area of environmental liability, see
Kenneth Abrahams, Cleaning up the Environmental Liability Mess, 27 VAL. U. L.
REV. 601 (1993).
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place an array of procedures, including Rule 23 class actions
and multidistricting and consolidation under Rule 42, that
permitted them to process civil cases collectively for some or all
purposes. These procedures had the potential to reduce the
costs of litigating mass claims and expedite disposition." 9
But their use in mass tort litigation was controversial, and
through the early 1980s courts proved reluctant to apply them
to this litigation, preferring to rely on a variety of ad hoc, in-
formal aggregative procedures."' ° In the absence of formal ag-
gregation, both plaintiffs' attorneys' and defendants' strategies
had to incorporate the possibility that they would be called on
to try myriad individual cases, with attendant high costs and
uncertain outcomes.
With the passage of time, and as mass litigation caseloads
mounted, some judges began to challenge the traditional think-
ing about the applicability of class actions, consolidated trials
and multidistricting to mass torts. By the end of the decade,
all of these formal aggregative devices had been used to resolve
mass tort litigation. In addition, some mass tort claims had
been resolved in bankruptcy proceedings and in some jurisdic-
tions state and federal judges were coordinating the disposition
of mass tort litigation.33' Now plaintiffs' attorneys and defen-
dants might proceed with the understanding that thousands of
cases-indeed, tens or hundreds of thousands of cases-might
be resolved as a result of a single negotiated agreement or trial
outcome. These changes in stakes and parties' expectations
had powerful effects on the dynamics of mass tort litigation,,
and may have further fueled the growth of mass litigation in
the late 1980s and early 1990s.
IV. WHY ARE MASS TORTS SO DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE?
Although there is much about mass tort litigation that is
controversial, few would disagree with the conclusion that the
" Resnik, supra note 16, at 46.
3' HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS, supra note 2, at 48-66; see also
Hensler, supra note 10, at 90 (noting the traditional hesitancy of courts to use
procedures such as class actions, consolidations and multidistrict litigation).
" Resnik, supra note 16, at 52-57; see also Schwarzer et al., supra note 13, at
1689-96 (discussing how state and federal judges can coordinate complex litigation
in their courts).
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cases have proved difficult to resolve efficiently and fairly.
Transaction costs-chiefly, legal fees-dwarf the amounts paid
to injured claimants, who often wait years to receive compen-
sation. Furthermore, the amounts recovered by similarly situ-
ated claimants may vary dramatically, and litigants with no
impairment may receive compensation while those with dis-
abling injuries receive little or no financial support. The courts
hold out the promise of individualized dispositions, but at best
deliver mass justice.
If courts have failed to deliver on the promise of justice in
mass personal injury litigation, it is not for want of trying.
Judges and lawyers have devised a variety of approaches to
deal with the special features of mass torts. When courts first
began to grapple seriously with mass personal injury litigation
in the 1980s, they focused their attention on managing pretrial
development of the cases-i.e., pleadings, discovery and motion
practice. Judges who found themselves dealing with thousands
of like cases, in which parties were represented by relatively
small numbers of attorneys on each side, fashioned a variety of
rules and practices to reduce duplicative activities and mini-
mize transaction costs." 2 Defense and plaintiffs' attorneys
generally cooperated in these efforts, which benefited all in-
volved in the litigation. Although there has been no empirical
analysis of the success of such efforts, it seems reasonable to
assume that they help to limit litigation costs, both for the
courts and the parties. But streamlining and expediting pretri-
al case development alone does not lead inevitably to efficient
or equitable case disposition. Efficient disposition of a large
volume of litigation concentrated within one or a small number
of courts requires some type of aggregative or collective proce-
dure. As a result, when courts have been precluded from using
'2 For example, trial judges have encouraged or required standardized
pleadings, eliminated or minimized the paperwork required for cross-complaints
(which are common in mass torts involving multiple defendants), developed stan-
dardized interrogatories anl adopted procedures for applying decisions on key
discovery motions to all cases in a litigation. In federal courts, in the context of
multidistrict litigation, judges can treat thousands of cases in such a standardized
fashion. In state courts, cases may also be transferred to a single judge for like
treatment. And, when federal and state judges agree to coordinate their rulings,
standardized pleadings, motions and rulings can be applied broadly to entire mass
tort caseloads. See HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS, supra note 2, at 68-
78, Schwarzer et al., supra note 13, at 1707-33.
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formal aggregative techniques, they have tended to adopt infor-
mal means of collective disposition. Whatever efficiencies have
been gained through the use of such procedures, however, have
often come at the price of equity, by pressing defendants to
settle cases in which liability was far from certain, and by forc-
ing plaintiffs to accept compensation that reflected their cur-
rent and future losses poorly, at best. Moreover, aggregative
dispositions-typically, negotiated settlements, rather than
adjudications of the facts and law-provide little or no opportu-
nity for plaintiffs publicly to voice their feelings that they have
been wrongfully harmed by defendants or, for defendants who
believe that they are not blameworthy, to vindicate them-
selves. In the face of aggregation, mass personal injury litiga-
tion inevitably becomes more of a financial transaction than a
dispute over defendants' culpability and plaintiffs' monetary
and nonmonetary losses. Further, by aggregating cases to
achieve efficient dispositions, courts may increase incentives of
plaintiffs' attorneys to expand the litigation to include claim-
ants with questionable losses or grounds for liability, which
may further diminish the compensation available to more mer-
itorious plaintiffs with significant losses, and drive up transac-
tions costs.
Understanding why mass personal injury litigation is so
difficult to resolve-and why aggregation has proved so prob-
lematic-requires understanding: (1) the special factual and
legal issues that arise when litigation involves latent (as con-
trasted with traumatic) injuries;333 (2) the peculiar risk pro-
file of the litigation, which confers special advantages on
plaintiffs' attorneys who represent large numbers of clients; (3)
" Many practitioners believe that mass litigation arising out of catastrophic
accidents, such as the Hyatt Skywalk collapse or the DuPont Plaza Hotel fire, is
relatively unproblematic by comparison with mass latent injury litigation. However,
although catastrophic accidents do not pose the causation problems associated with
mass latent injury litigation, mass catastrophes do present similar strategic oppor-
tunities for plaintiffs' attorneys, as evidenced by the large numbers of claimants
and defendants associated with such litigation, relative to the number of fatalities
and the apparent singularity of the source of injuries. For example, the total num-
ber of claims filed in the Dupont Plaza Hotel fire-which killed 97 occupants and
injured several hundred more-was 2300, and the number of defendants was up-
ward of 250, although the fire was actually set by a single disgruntled worker and
the hotel was owned by a single financial entity. See supra text accompanying
notes 59-70.
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the issues that future injuries and future plaintiffs pose for
settlement efforts; and (4) the conflicts of interest inherent in
collective litigation that involves defendants and insurers with
different and competing risks of liability, plaintiffs, both cur-
rent and future, whose injuries differ greatly in severity, and
plaintiffs' attorneys with different types of practices, and with
all of these interests varying among suits brought in various
states with differing law, procedures and patterns of jury ver-
dicts.
A. Factual and Legal Issues
For mass litigation to occur, both plaintiffs' attorneys and
defendants must believe that the expected value of the litiga-
tion-the likelihood of establishing causation and liability,
multiplied by the likely value of damages in an individual
case-is great enough to warrant a significant investment of
time and capital in the litigation. Both plaintiffs' attorneys'
and defendants' estimates of expected value are powerfully
influenced by the numerosity, commonality and interdepen-
dence of case values, which distinguishes mass torts from ordi-
nary personal injury litigation: The larger the number of po-
tential claims and the greater the likelihood that common
factors among claims will pull the values of many claims up-
ward, the larger the expected value of the litigation.
At the inception of the litigation, however, all sides' esti-
mates of expected value are highly uncertain, depending-as
they must-on guesses as to likely judicial decisions on discov-
ery motions, evidentiary issues, choice of law and other doc-
trinal issues and trial juries' likely reactions to the facts of the
cases. Indeed, at the inception of litigation, scientific evidence
on causation may not be fully developed, and whether evidence
can be assembled to establish defendant liability may not be
known to defendants or plaintiffs. 34
' Bendectin litigation appears to have spurred scientific research on causation.
See Sanders, supra note 90, at 303. Key information establishing Robins' knowl-
edge of problems associated with the Dalkon Shield did not appear until late in
the litigation.
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1. Causation
All successful tort litigation requires that the plaintiff
establish (or persuade the defendant that she could establish),
to the satisfaction of the factfinder, that an action or omission
on the part of the defendant was the cause-in-fact of the
claimant's injuries. Whether incurred in a single accident or as
a result of a mass catastrophe, such as a building collapse,
linking traumatic injuries, such as fractures, to an event is
usually relatively easy. But for latent injuries, establishing
causation is far more difficult. The plaintiff first must establish
that the type of product use or exposure that she alleges is
capable of causing her alleged injuries (general causation), and
then establish that this use or exposure was the cause-in-fact
of injury in this case (specific causation).
Mass toxic tort litigation will not move forward unless
plaintiffs' attorneys can persuade themselves and defendants
that they can establish general causation. Usually this will
require winning at least a few jury trials, which in turn will
require that judges permit plaintiffs to introduce the scientific
evidence on which their causation claims rest, and that juries
accept that evidence as proof of causation. As they contemplate
initiating or defending toxic tort litigation, both plaintiff attor-
neys and defendants have a number of reasons to be uncertain
about plaintiffs' ability to prevail on the causation issue.
First, at the early stages of litigation the scientific evi-
dence of a causal link between product use or exposure and the
damages claimed, in truth, may be uncertain. Science evolves
over time: Evidence that first appears to support a causal link,
later may be controverted. Conversely, evidence of causation
that first appears shaky, over time, may be bolstered by new
studies. Moreover, there are a variety of scientific approaches
for investigating causal links between substance exposure and
disease, including epidemiology (the study of the spread of
disease in human populations) and laboratory experimentation
with tissue cultures (i.e., in vitro) and live animals (i.e., in
vivo). Each of these has its strengths and weaknesses. In some
instances, results from one sort of scientific investigation point
in one direction, while results from another point in the oppo-
site direction. In addition, scientific evidence of causation may
be different for different diseases, or even for different demo-
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graphic groups. In the context of mass litigation, these differ-
ences either may be ignored, or may themselves become a
source of dispute. 35
For some of the litigation discussed in Part II (e.g., asbes-
tos litigation) the scientific evidence linking exposure and cer-
tain diseases was well established by the 1980s. With regard to
others (e.g., silicone breast implants and electromagnetic radia-
tion) the scientific evidence remains uncertain. The evidence of
infant neurological impairment resulting from ingestion of lead
is quite strong; the evidence of effects on older children is dis-
puted. Moreover, the prospect of litigation itself, may, stimu-
late scientific research. Professor Sanders has documented the
complex relationship between scientific investigations of
Bendectin and the litigation."6
In addition to the uncertainties attendant upon science
itself, there are uncertainties about how courts will respond to
whatever scientific evidence is available. There has been con-
siderable variation in judges' willingness to permit plaintiffs to
present key causation evidence to juries. For example, Judge
Jack B. Weinstein refused to allow claimants who opted out of
the Agent Orange class action litigation to take their case to
jury trial, because there was inadequate epidemiological evi-
dence to demonstrate a causal link between dioxin exposure
and the plaintiffs' alleged injuries."' In Ferebee v. Chev-
ron,33 however, the district court permitted a plaintiff alleg-
ing injuries due to the pesticide Paraquat to take his case to
jury, notwithstanding the absence of epidemiological evidence
demonstrating the existence of a causal link between his type
of exposure and his injuries. In both cases, the plaintiffs were
prepared to submit clinical evidence of causation. In Agent
Orange, the trial judge deemed the clinical evidence inade-
quate as a matter of law to establish a claim; in Ferebee the
Discussions of the problems of dealing with scientific evidence in courts
abound. See, e.g., Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 50 FORDHAM
L. REV. 595 (1988); Troy Brennen, Helping Courts With Toxic Torts: Some Propos-
als Regarding Alternative Methods for Presenting and Assessing Scientific Evidence
in Common Law Courts, 51 U. PITT. L. REv. 1, 10-19 (1989).
See Sanders, supra note 90, at 331-48.
In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1229 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988); see
also SCHUCK, supra note 10, at 234-42.
736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
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court held that the adequacy of the clinical evidence was a fact
question that was appropriate for jury decision.339 Moreover,
even when they do permit cases with uncertain scientific evi-
dence to go to trial, judges may exercise their authority to
exclude certain types of evidence, perhaps thereby weakening
the plaintiffs case. Appellate courts have generally (although
not always) upheld trial courts' evidentiary decisions.340
Although the recent Supreme Court decision on Daubert
made it clear that the Federal Rules of Evidence govern judi-
cial decisions on the admissibility of scientific evidence,341 the
Court did not specify a bright-line test for judges to use when
deciding what kinds of evidence may be presented to a jury.
Thus, uncertainty will continue over whether particular evi-
dence of causation in specific cases will meet the trial judge's
standards for admissibility. Moreover, there is likely to be
continued variation in judicial decisions on admissibility of the
same evidence across jurisdictions.
Finally, there has been considerable variation in juries'
evaluation of evidence of causation, even within the same liti-
gation. For example, although the jury that heard the consoli-
dated trial of Bendectin cases in the middle district of Ohio
delivered a defense verdict on causation, at least two juries
339 736 F.2d at 1534.
311 See, e.g., Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 151 (upholding, inter alia, Judge
Weinstein's refusal to permit Agent Orange opt-out plaintiffs to proceed to trial on
clinical evidence of causation); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d
1128 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding trial court's refusal to admit plaintiffs' analyses of
unpublished epidemiological analyses and granting of summary judgment), vacated,
113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
..1 In Daubert, a case arising out of Bendectin litigation, the Supreme Court
was asked to decide whether the Federal Rules of Evidence adopted in 1975 su-
perseded the Frye rule adopted in Frye v. United States, 293 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923). Under Frye, evidence not "generally accepted" by the scientific community
was deemed insufficiently reliable and, thus, inadmissible. Subsequent to the adop-
tion of the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts divided on the issue of whether Frye
still applied. The Daubert Court explicitly rejected the applicability of Frye and
placed decisions of admissibility squarely on the shoulders of the trial judge. More-
over, the Court refused to set forth specific tests for admissibility of scientific
evidence, such as publication in a peer-reviewed journal, which had been proposed
by respondents and their amici. Rather, the Court admonished trial judges to
determine whether the evidence proffered by parties met standards for "good sci-
ence," variously defined. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2786; see also Bert Black & John
Singer, From Frye to Daubert: A New Test For Scientific Evidence, 1 SHEPARD'S
EXPERT & Sc. EVID. Q. 19 (1993).
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prior to that trial and four juries subsequently found for the
plaintiff in individual Bendectin cases.342 Over the long
course of asbestos worker injury litigation, some juries have
delivered defense verdicts on general causation, notwithstand-
ing substantial scientific evidence that asbestos exposure caus-
es various injuries.
2. Liability
In addition to persuading themselves and defendants that
they can prove general causation, plaintiffs' attorneys need to
convince themselves and the defendants that the factfinders
will hold the defendants legally responsible for plaintiffs' inju-
ries. For a number of reasons, this may be less difficult than it
is to demonstrate their ability to prevail on the causation is-
sue.
First, in the face of the expansion of product liability doc-
trine and the evidence in the late 1970s and early 1980s of
rising product liability caseloads, increasing rates of plaintiff
success at trial and increasing jury awards, manufacturers
have apparently become convinced that the civil justice system
has tilted against them. In particular, many corporate defen-
dants believe that juries tend to sympathize with injured indi-
viduals and, therefore, consistently deliver verdicts against so-
called "deep pocket" defendants, without regard to the evidence
and legal rules that should govern their decision. Thus, defen-
dants may be inclined to believe that if plaintiffs' attorneys can
get their liability case before juries, the plaintiffs will prevail.
In addition, experienced defense counsel for mass toxic tort
defendants fear that in many instances, the extensive discov-
ery permitted under contemporary rules of civil procedure will
uncover documents related to corporate review of the risks and
benefits associated with their products that plaintiffs may be
able to use to persuade juries that defendants inappropriately
discounted potential harms to product users. For their part,
plaintiffs' attorneys may well expect that if they invest suffi-
cient time and effort in the discovery process they will be able
32 See Sanders, supra note 90, at 401 (Table 9) (listing nine Bendectin cases
reviewed by appellate courts that had reached a jury verdict after trial, three of
which resulted in defense verdicts).
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to locate such "smoking guns." In a unitary trial (where causa-
tion, liability, and damages are tried together and the jury
deliberates after it has heard evidence on all matters of fact),
such documents may loom larger in jurors' minds than the
likely more ambiguous scientific evidence on general causa-
tion.343 Such documents have been used successfully not only
to establish liability but also to obtain large punitive damage
awards in asbestos litigation, Dalkon Shield litigation, Shiley
Heart Valve litigation and silicone breast implant litigation,
among others.3" The potential for exposing "bad documents"
also poses broader risks to corporate defendants with an inter-
est in protecting brand names and corporate image.
That juries will find defendants liable is, however, by no
means certain. In tobacco litigation, juries to date have demon-
strated considerable skepticism towards the claim that manu-
facturers should be held liable for the injury or death of plain-
tiffs who continued to smoke in the face of widespread public
information about smoking-related risks. The tobacco cases
suggest that assumption of risk may be a strong defense in
circumstances where information about risks and risk avoid-
ance strategies is widespread and where there is considerable
evidence that individuals indeed can reduce their risk by
changing their own behavior.345
Mass toxic tort litigation poses other challenges to
plaintiffs' attorneys' ability to demonstrate liability as well.
These challenges derive from the long period between initial
exposure to the injurious product or substance and the filing of
the lawsuit. To establish liability of any particular defendant,
the plaintiff generally must be able to link that defendant's
product to the alleged injury. But in cases where injuries oc-
curred some years ago and where different manufacturers'
" For experimental evidence of the effect of trial structure on jury outcomes in
complex cases, see Irvin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An Experimental
Investigation of Procedural Issues in Complex Tort Trials, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
269 (1990).
'" See supra text accompanying notes 112-31, 142-96 & 229-40.
341 See Schwartz, supra note 26. A factor akin to assumption of risk may influ-
ence some juries in silicone breast implant cases, who are widely believed to be
less willing to assign liability to defendants when plaintiffs chose to obtain breast
implants for "purely cosmetic" reasons. See, e.g., Woman Loses Breast Implant
Lawsuit, LA. TIMES, June 12, 1993, at A21 (reporting a failed $7 million lawsuit
brought by "ex-topless dancer").
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products were used interchangeably, it may be difficult-if not
impossible-to establish this product-injury nexus. For exam-
ple, in the early days of asbestos litigation, plaintiffs' attorneys
had to devote considerable effort to developing evidence about
the specific products that were used in different shipyards and
other worksites.346
Demonstrating a product-injury nexus poses even larger
problems when neither plaintiff nor defendant have any way of
establishing what specific product was associated with the
plaintiffs injury. For example, in DES cases, the injured party
is the daughter or grandchild of a woman who took DES while
pregnant. Usually, the DES user does not recall the specific
brand of the drug that was prescribed, nor is there any docu-
mentary record. In Sindell, the court responded to this problem
by recognizing a "market share" theory of liability, which held
all DES manufacturers liable for the injury and apportioned
damages among them in proportion to their individual shares
of the market. But courts generally have been unwilling to ex-
tend market share liability to other litigation. For example, the
courts' unwillingness to apply the market share theory to lead
litigation so far has stymied mass lead injury litigation against
paint manufacturers. However, some plaintiff attorneys assert
that they will be able to develop evidence linking specific paint
manufacturers and products to particular housing units, thus
overcoming this obstacle to suits against manufacturers by
tenant-parents of lead-impaired children.
As a practical matter, most mass tort litigation to date has
not posed this problem: the Dalkon Shield was manufactured
only by A.H. Robins, Bendectin only by Merrell-Dow and the
Shiley Heart Valve by Shiley, Inc., which was later purchased
by Pfizer. DDT was dumped into the Tennessee River in
Triana, Alabama by Olin. Asbestos was manufactured by many
corporations, but litigators have been able to develop evidence
indicating what specific products were actually used at differ-
ent worksites. Only in cases where it is truly impossible to
determine who manufactured the product in question, will a
' Once the evidence was collected, however, it was used repeatedly as claim-
ants came forward from these sites. The ability to use evidence gathered for one
case in a large number of other cases is an example of the economies of scale
that flow from plaintiffs' attorney's representation of a large number of claimants.
See HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS, supra note 2, at 68-82.
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Sindell-like approach be necessary for mass tort litigation to go
forward.
3. Damages
Finally, to succeed, plaintiffs must demonstrate that their
claims have real monetary value. Although the total monetary
value of mass litigation is the sum of damages for all individu-
als in the injury pool who can establish causation and liability,
it usually requires some number of jury trials to establish that
these individuals' cases, in fact, do have substantial monetary
value. Thus, the nationwide surge of silicone breast implant
litigation occurred after an award of $7.3 million by a San
Francisco jury, and gained further impetus when a Texas jury
awarded $28 million in a similar trial the following year. A
large damage award to users of the Copper-7 intrauterine
device led many to believe that litigation over that product
ultimately might assume the dimensions of the Dalkon Shield
litigation. Sizeable awards to asbestos cancer victims appear to
have increased the value of all asbestos claims, even for those
victims who do not allege any current impairment.
Conversely, if plaintiffs' attorneys fail to establish that
individual claims have significant value, the value of the entire
litigation will be called into question. A Mississippi jury's 47
award of zero damages to a plaintiff claiming injury due to
smoking-one of the few plaintiff victories ever reported in
tobacco litigation-signalled to many the unlikelihood that
suits by smokers would ever be transformed into mass litiga-
tion. Efforts to develop mass litigation against manufacturers
of diet products have apparently foundered because the alleged
injuries are associated with modest losses.
The potential for punitive damages has a significant influ-
ence on the value of mass tort litigation. For example, when a
jury in east Texas awarded $3.8 million in punitive damages to
four asbestos plaintiffs whose injuries varied from clinical
evidence of asbestos exposure with no impairment to severe
disability, defendants agreed to settle the class of 30 claims
that the 4 plaintiffs represented for $12 million, or about
$400,000 per claim. Generally, during this period, asbestos
" Horton v. American Tobacco Co., 508 So. 2d 1057 (Miss. 1990).
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claims had been settling for less than $200,000 per claim.3 4
Similarly, after a jury awarded $75,000 in punitive damages
(and $10,000 in compensatory damages) to a Dalkon Shield
plaintiff in 1975, claims began settling for an average of
$11,000. In 1985, after juries awarded two Shield plaintiffs
$1.75 million in punitive damages, and a third plaintiff $7.5
million in punitive damages, A.H. Robins sought the protection
of Chapter 11."' In another example, that a Texas breast im-
plant verdict included $20 million in punitive damages was not
lost on plaintiff attorneys around the country. 5 ' And, al-
though in the early years of Copper-7 litigation Searle won 15
out of 17 trials, after a jury awarded Esther Kociemba $8.75
million in damages, including $7 million in punitive damages,
the company agreed to settle all of the 130 Copper-7 suits that
had been brought against it by Kociemba's law firm. 5'
Records about defendants' knowledge of product-related
risks, and their response to this knowledge have played a criti-
cal role in obtaining large punitive damage award. Plaintiffs'
attorneys' discovery of the Sumner-Simpson papers, indicating
manufacturers' awareness of asbestos-related injuries, led to
punitive damage verdicts and may have changed the course of
asbestos litigation. Documents obtained through legal discov-
ery indicating that A.H. Robins had been informed by its own
staff of risks associated with the Dalkon Shield design, led to
the large punitive damage verdicts in those cases. Some courts
have limited plaintiffs' attorneys' search for or use of docu-
ments that might lead to punitive damages, by refusing to
admit such documents in evidence, or by granting secrecy or-
ders that prohibited the use of documents discovered in one
case from being used in another.
When punitive damage claims fail, the value of mass liti-
gation may plunge. For example, the Chicago salmonella litiga-
tion against Jewel Foods began as mass litigation, involving
many claims. But most of the claims involved minor injuries;
their value rested on the potential for punitive damages
See MOLLY SELVIN & LARRY PICUS, THE DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE:
OBSERVATIONS FROM A RECENT ASBESTOS CASE (1987); PETERSON & SELVIN, supra
note 220, at 46-47.
... See supra text accompanying notes 123-31.
... See supra text accompanying notes 186-87.
"' See supra text accompanying notes 132-41.
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against the supermarket chain. When a class action of the
punitive damages claim ended with a defense verdict, the val-
ue of claims dropped dramatically and plaintiffs' attorneys
agreed to a procedure under which serious claims were litigat-
ed individually, and the remainder were negotiated using an
alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") process. 52
B. The Special Risk Profile of Mass Litigation
Although uncertainty about the plaintiffs' ability to estab-
lish causation and liability and win large damages colors the
early stages of mass personal injury litigation, the risks that
plaintiff attorneys and defendants face at the litigation's incep-
tion are not symmetric. For plaintiffs' attorney firms, the cost
of losing is determined by the size of the firm's investment in
the litigation, including the cost to cover expenses associated
with identifying clients (e.g., advertising, referral fees, medical
screening exams); developing the facts of individual plaintiffs'
cases (e.g., discovery of documents and medical exams); prepar-
ing cases for trial (e.g., deposing expert witnesses); and, per-
haps, aiding in developing scientific evidence of general causa-
tion. There is wide variation in how much plaintiffs' law firms
invest to obtain and prepare their cases. Some firms (common-
ly termed "boutique firms") screen potential cases carefully,
select only those for which liability appears strong and damag-
es large and invest substantial amounts in developing the
cases they accept. At the other extreme, some firms adopt a
more "wholesale" approach based on representing a large num-
ber of claims. These firms may make substantial investments
to obtain cases, but spend relatively little to develop individual
cases for settlement or trial. Whatever the approach, plaintiffs'
firms may invest hundreds of thousands or even millions of
dollars before realizing any income from their mass tort
claims.
Experienced firms, however, can balance the size of their
caseload and their expenses to limit their risk to an amount
they deem acceptable. Much of the financial risk of acquiring
cases is mitigated by fee arrangements with lawyers who refer
cases: Referring lawyers continue to represent a client as co-
.52 See supra text accompanying note 203.
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counsel and are paid a share of the contingency fee only if and
when defendants settle. By joining forces either through court-
appointed plaintiffs' steering committees or informal litigation
groups, plaintiffs' law firms can limit the risk to each firm by
sharing costs of discovery and scientific investigation. Indeed
because of the interdependence of claim values, some firms
might avoid the significant costs of preparing and trying cases,
by free-riding on success of other firms that take their cases to
trialY
3
Balanced against the costs for a plaintiffs' firm is the huge
potential recovery if the firm successfully represents scores,
hundreds or even thousands of claims. Several implications
follow from this balance. First, a plaintiffs' law firm may be
willing to invest substantial sums in developing scientific infor-
mation and otherwise preparing and trying one or a few cases.
Investments that could not be justified for a single case are, in
contrast, sound when the firm knows that its entire portfolio of
cases will gain value if lead cases succeed. Second, as a result
of the special cost-benefit relationship for mass torts, the firm
can justify additional expenses simply by acquiring a larger
portfolio of claims. With a sufficient number of claims, the
potential returns will exceed any costs. Third, plaintiffs' firms
may pursue potential mass tort cases even where liability and
causation are highly uncertain. Because potential returns are
so great, plaintiffs' firms can accept high risks that they would
not bear in ordinary litigation where returns are limited to one
or a few cases.
For defendants, the cost of losing early in the litigation is
determined not just by the cost of defending the early cases
and indemnifying claimants who prevail, but also by the in-
crease in value of other pending claims that will then ensue,
and by the fact that each plaintiff verdict will encourage new
case filings. When the pool of potential claimants (all those
who used the product or were exposed to the substance) num-
bers in the hundreds of thousands or millions, when there is a
finite possibility that each exposed individual might be deemed
" But defendants may be able to exploit such free-riders. Searle settled its
Copper 7 cases with only the one firm that had invested heavily and shown that
it could succeed at trial. Searle gambled successfully that other firms would not be
able to carry the litigation. See supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
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to have a viable claim, if only for emotional damages, and
when punitive damages of large and unpredictable amounts
can be awarded over and over, the defendant's exposure may
appear well-nigh unlimited-in the common parlance, a "bet
the company" proposition.
In deciding what strategy they should adopt, defendants
must consider the possibility that one or more judges or juries
will decide against them, even if they have been advised that
their scientific case is strong. Indeed, plaintiffs won the first
Bendectin trial and several subsequent trials.354 Litigation is
uncertain even with strong cases and fair judges and juries,
and defendants should expect a few anomalous verdicts among
the universe of trial dispositions. If such verdicts occur ran-
domly, there is a finite chance that they will occur during the
initial phase of litigation. Thus, while the special characteris-
tics of mass torts spur plaintiffs' attorneys to invest heavily in
preparing for trial, they may lead defendants to shy away from
trial. This extreme risk aversion is becoming more apparent as
defendants (and their insurers) better understand mass torts.
Prior to the consolidated trial that resulted in a defense verdict
and the virtual collapse of the litigation against them, Merrell-
Dow had offered $120 million to settle the proposed Bendectin
class action. 5' More recently, Pfizer agreed to settle tens of
thousands of Shiley Heart Valve claims before many cases had
been tried. Breast implant defendants may settle that litiga-
tion for billions of dollars before scientific research on causa-
tion is completed.
Moreover, some judges are not adverse to using the poten-
tial for such jury outcomes as levers to achieve settlement even
when the scientific evidence is thin. For example, despite
Judge Weinstein's declaration that there was insufficient scien-
tific evidence to sustain the Agent Orange "opt-out" claims, he
was instrumental in securing a $180 million settlement of the
Agent Orange class action litigation. Similarly, special master
Frances McGovern engineered a $15 million settlement of the
second DDT class action in Triana, Alabama although there
was little scientific support for a link between DDT ingestion
... See supra note 83.
... See supra text accompanying note 84.
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and the plaintiffs' alleged injuries.356
Because the risks facing the corporate defendant are larg-
er than the risks facing any one plaintiffs' law firm, and be-
cause plaintiffs' firms have discovered the value of joining
forces and pursuing cooperative strategies against defendants,
defendants in mass tort litigation may not hold the same ad-
vantages over the plaintiff that they have in ordinary tort
litigation. As a result, they may be more willing to settle ques-
tionable claims than would ordinarily be the case. But this in
turn further strengthens the plaintiffs' attorney's hand, and
may provide incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to take on more
questionable litigation and to dip even deeper into the poten-
tial claimant pool once litigation is well underway. Indeed,
after the initial investment in the litigation has been made,
plaintiffs' attorney firms have incentives to identify many more
claimants so that they can spread their costs across this client
pool, and maximize their fees. Thus, the economics of mass tort
litigation, and the asymmetric risks facing plaintiff attorneys
and defendants have the potential to drive the litigation for-
ward, ever broadening its scope, until it reaches either the
limits of the exposed population or the limits of the available
defendant assets.
C. Future Injuries and Future Plaintiffs
When product use or exposure to substances causes latent
injuries, the product is likely to remain on the market for
many years. As a result, there is likely to be a long period of
time following the first recognition of a causal link between
exposure and injury during which individuals will become ill,
be diagnosed as suffering from an injury linked to the exposure
and appear as plaintiffs in court. The civil law is not well fash-
ioned to deal with this latent injury process. Asbestos worker
injury litigation offers the most vivid example of the "futures"
problem posed by all or most latent injury litigation.
Statutes of limitation typically require that individuals
make legal claims within a few years of when they know (or
should have known) that they were injured as a result of prod-
uct use or exposure.357 Since clinical evidence of injury may
3 See supra text accompanying note 241.
Prior to the surge of mass toxic tort litigation, many states required that
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appear well before an individual suffers serious impairment,
the result is that many of those filing claims will have little or
no current impairment. Consequently, statutes of limitations
have encouraged the filing of many marginal claims. Many
asbestos defendants assert that the majority of claims they
now face are, in their view, frivolous, in that the claimants
have clinical signs of exposure (i.e., pleural conditions) but no
current sign of impairment. Most of these claimants, they as-
sert, will never develop asbestos-related impairment. Damages
in these cases must be based primarily on estimates of future
medical expenses and work loss or non-monetary losses due to
concern about their fate (e.g., fear of cancer claims)-both
highly subjective and subject to controversy.
Despite the subjective nature of their injuries, some asbes-
tos plaintiffs with pleural conditions have received large ver-
dicts at trial.3 8 Plaintiffs' lawyers convince juries that plain-
tiffs with pleural conditions face a future of cancer or debilitat-
ing lung impairment-an example of how in mass torts less
serious cases borrow value from serious cases.359 Because
these cases have value at trial, they have value in settlement.
But because average verdicts are less for plaintiffs with pleural
conditions than for claims involving present impairment, pleu-
ral cases typically have less value than other asbestos claims.
Thus, asbestos plaintiffs with pleural conditions are faced with
a dilemma. Although they are not currently impaired, some
will later develop serious asbestos-related disease, since per-
sons with pleural conditions have increased risks of asbestos-
related cancers.360 Because settlements of pleural claims are
relatively small, those settlements will be woefully inadequate
should these plaintiffs subsequently develop asbestos-related
personal injury claims be filed within one or a few years of the occurrence of
injury. Because the injury may be deemed to have happened at the time of first
product use or substance exposure, this rule effectively barred many individuals
with latent injuries from filing claims. The more recent interpretation circumvents
this problem by setting time of first knowledge of the injury as the event that
begins tolling the statute. See HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURT, supra
note 2, at 37-41.
" In Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 739 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Tex. 1990), the
East Texas class action, juries awarded larger verdicts to plaintiffs with pleural
conditions than to those with more serious asbestosis.
3'9 See SELVIN & PICUS, supra note 348.
... Selikoff et al., supra note 287, at 22.
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cancer. Some courts have attempted to deal with this problem
by establishing "registries," which allow plaintiffs to secure
their right to claim in a timely fashion, while postponing any
estimate of damages and settlement until their injury becomes
more serious.36' But postponing payment of the claim may
mean that a plaintiff's attorney has no means to receive com-
pensation for time invested in the case. As a result, some
plaintiffs' attorneys have opposed this solution to the problem
of future impairment. Disputes over this aspect of the "futures"
problem have contributed to the emotional "heat" surrounding
asbestos litigation, further complicating settlement. 62
In addition to those who already show some clinical signs
of injury, however limited its effect, there are those who have
been exposed to the product-perhaps unwittingly-but have
not yet asserted legal claims. If claims are paid simply in the
order in which they are filed, but without regard to severity of
injury, those with little or no current impairment who come
forward early will secure compensation, and those with serious
impairments who come forward later may find that there are
no funds left to provide them with compensation for their loss-
es.
The potential for a "race to the courthouse" has contribut-
ed to trial judges' willingness to certify mandatory (non-"opt
out") Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class actions for all or some aspects of
mass tort litigation, under a "limited fund" theory. A mandato-
ry class was successfully certified for punitive damage claims
in the Salmonella cases,363 but most other 23(b)(1)(B) class
action certifications have been vacated by appellate courts.3"
Whether or not a limited fund class is certified, defendants
may adopt a strategy of trying to obtain a "global settlement"
of mass tort litigation, including not only all currently pending
claims, but all future claims, as well. The $215 million settle-
:61 See Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in As-
bestos Litigation, 75 JUDICATURE 318 (1992) (noting the advantages of deferral
registries).
.62 For a discussion of the consequence of "heat" for resolving mass toxic torts,
see PETERSON & SELVIN, supra note 220, at 36 (discussing how emotions caused
by the litigation can both inflame jurors and upset litigants).
See supra text accompanying notes 202-03.
3" See, e.g., In re N. Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982).
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ment of Shiley Heart Valve claims, now on appeal, and the
$4.75 billion offer to settle breast implant claims, are intended
to bind future as well as present claimants.365
Efforts to bind future claimants, however, are fraught with
problems. How many claimants ultimately will come forward?
When there is uncertainty about disease etiology and about the
magnitude of exposure to products and substances, it is impos-
sible to determine with certainty how many individuals ulti-
mately will suffer disease and be able to present viable claims.
At the time the first Manville Trust agreement was signed,
there were about 26,000 claims pending against Manville, and
the parties estimated the total number of future claims at less
than 100,000; within about two years, 90,000 new claims had
appeared and the Trust was insolvent.3" A recent court-ap-
pointed expert panel has estimated that there may be as many
as 300,000 more asbestos claims brought in the future.
Even when there is more certainty about the number of
possible future claims-for example, when the product manu-
facturer has firm figures on the total number of products mar-
keted and the injury rate is reasonably well-estab-
lished-courts must wrestle with the question of how to repre-
sent future claimants in settlement negotiations. This issue is
at the core of controversy over the recently announced settle-
ments of future claims against a large group as asbestos manu-
facturers.36 In formal aggregative proceedings, such as Chap-
ter 11 proceedings and Rule 23 class actions, judges have ap-
pointed attorneys to represent future claimants, but the notion
of clientless attorneys challenges our concept of the adversarial
process. In more informal aggregative settlement proceedings,
the nature and effectiveness of future claimant representation
is even more obscure.
D. Conflicting Interests
In the paradigmatic personal injury suit, there are two
parties with opposing interests, two attorneys, each of whose
See supra text accompanying notes 151-57 & 193-96.
z Hensler, Fashioning a Resolution, supra note 2, at 1971.
3 See Henry Weinstein, Debate Rages as Court Gets Plan to Settle Asbestos
Cases, L.A. TImES, Feb. 21, 1994, at Al, A24-25.
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interests are aligned with their clients, and a neutral judge.
Mass personal injury litigation breaks this paradigmatic mold
in all respects.36
On the plaintiffs' side, there are individuals with varying
degrees of injury and with claims of varying strength against
specific defendants. Some would best be served by receiving
immediate compensation, while others would best be served by
delaying settlement. Some would better be served by a settle-
ment that spends down all defendant assets in the short-term,
while others would better be served by a settlement that pre-
serves assets into the future at a cost of diminishing short-
term payments. Some plaintiffs' attorneys, whose caseloads are
characterized by volume rather than quality of claim, will best
be served by a short-term global resolution of the litigation for
a large lump sum, from which they will receive a large fee,
although their clients may each receive as compensation only a
small fraction of their ultimate losses. Other plaintiffs' attor-
neys, whose caseloads comprise a smaller number of claims
with large damages and strong evidence of defendant culpabili-
ty, will best be served by a lengthier process resulting in trial
verdicts that will enhance the value of all of their cases, ulti-
mately yielding them generous fees and yielding their clients
generous settlements.
On the defendants' side, where multiple product manufac-
turers are involved, there will also be diverse and conflicting
interests. Some defendants, whose market share was relatively
modest and whose files hold little in the way of incriminating
evidence, may best be served by striking agreements with
plaintiffs' attorneys that offer modest payments in return for
modest attorney investment. Such payments can be used, in
turn, by these plaintiffs' attorneys to subsidize their battles
against defendants with greater exposure (and deeper pockets).
Other defendants may believe that they face financial ruin if
they adopt a conciliatory stance early in the litigation process.
Moreover, over the course of the litigation, individual
defendants' posture will change, as some deplete their insur-
ance coverage, or as the characteristics of the claimant pool
" The varying interests of parties and their attorneys are discussed in detail
in Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L.
REV. 469 (1994).
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change. The interests of defendants differ from those of their
insurers, and insurers differ among themselves, depending on
the level, years and terms of their policies. Defendants' attor-
neys, in turn, have financial incentives to pursue aggressive
litigation strategies that may not be best for defendants or
insurers. Even the judges in mass tort litigation may eschew
their paradigmatic role, as the pressures of mass torts cause
some to avoid the litigation while others become caught up in
the challenge of settling "mega-cases.""9
E. The Aggregation Dilemma
As mass tort claims flooded their courtrooms, trial judges
quickly learned that they could not deal with the cases individ-
ually. In the face of appellate courts' resistance to the use of
formal aggregative techniques, courts informally aggregated
cases for settlement and trial. But court efforts to achieve
efficient and equitable resolution of mass torts through aggre-
gation have foundered on the factual realities of the cases, the
peculiar incentives created by the special risk profile of mass
litigation, the problems posed by future claimants and the
conflicts of interest among parties and attorneys.
For defendants, aggregating cases and arriving at a global
resolution of mass litigation offers a means of capping their
exposure. Global resolutions that depend upon a single litiga-
tion event-for example, consolidated trials, or trials of class
actions--carry high risks. But global settlements are attractive
even when the price is high, because they offer the opportunity
to reduce uncertainty and limit transaction costs. However,
when mass torts involve multiple defendants with different
degrees of exposure, even these attractions may not produce
agreement among defendants as to a favorable global resolu-
tion.
Plaintiffs' attorneys' interests in aggregation and global
resolution may also be mixed. "Boutique" attorneys believe
that it is in their and their clients' interest to pursue individu-
al cases to trial, in order to demonstrate the value of their
caseload, and then to negotiate settlements of the remainder of
" For a discussion of the judge's interest in mass litigation, see Peterson &
Selvin, supra note 16.
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their cases. Plaintiff attorneys with larger numbers of less
valuable cases are more supportive of aggregation and global
resolution: By achieving a class action settlement, they can
maximize the total recovery for the largest number of claim-
ants, and maximize their total fees. Disputes among plaintiffs'
attorneys are played out in the form of competition to serve on
court-appointed plaintiffs' "steering committees." When federal
silicone breast implant cases were assigned to Judge Sam C.
Pointer Jr., class action proponent Stanley Chesley vied for co-
chairmanship of the committee against attorneys who had
opposed him in his unsuccessful effort to certify a breast im-
plant class in the federal district court in Cincinnati. After an
attempt to reach a compromise among the more than 100
plaintiffs' firms involved in the litigation failed, each group
submitted its own slate of candidates to Judge Pointer.
3Y0
If some plaintiffs' attorneys are not prepared to agree with
a global resolution, the attractiveness of the resolution will be
diminished for defendants, whose prime goal is to bring all
litigation to an end. Moreover, unhappy plaintiffs' attorneys
are likely to challenge global resolutions. Because appellate
courts remain uncomfortable with aggregative procedures, such
challenges may well be sustained. Uncertainty about whether
a particular global resolution will survive an appeal, in turn,
will further diminish the value of the resolution to defendants.
In addition, global resolution requires courts and parties to
perform difficult estimations of the value of claims that are
pending but have not been tried or even completed discovery.
If global resolutions are sought early in mass tort litigation,
there may be little agreement on what particular types of cases
are "worth." Moreover, global resolution requires decisions
concerning the future: to cap the defendants' liability, the reso-
lution must bind future as well as present claimants. Reaching
agreement on the number and value of future claims is also
difficult.
Because global resolutions are so hard to achieve, courts
and parties often attempt to devise partial resolutions of mass
tort litigation, securing payments for cases brought against
some defendants, or by certain plaintiffs' attorney firms alleg-
... Alison Frankel, Implant Litigation: Heavy Politics, Lingering Questions, AM.
LAW., Sept. 1992, at 90.
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ing a particular fact pattern, or for cases filed in a particular
jurisdiction. Such resolutions have been achieved for large
groups of asbestos cases, for some Copper-7 cases and, most
recently, for breast implant cases. Inevitably these partial
resolutions lead to an inequitable allocation of compensation as
the availability of assets to compensate plaintiffs either dimin-
ishes over time, or ebbs and flows with the entrance and exit
of different insurers and defendants. Because the litigation
continues, there are continuing expenditures for legal fees and
expenses, which further deplete defense resources for compen-
sation. As some defendants exit the litigation, plaintiffs' attor-
neys cast their nets further to include other defendants. Con-
tinuing litigation attracts additional plaintiffs' attorney firms,
with new, often weaker cases, and new strategic interests.
V. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
Proposals for improving the resolution of mass personal
injury litigation range from creative adaptations of current
rules to formal revisions in current rules and to substitution of
new fora and compensation mechanisms for current legal pro-
cesses. Most proposals for change focus on procedure rather
than substantive doctrine, and most are aimed at increasing
judges' ability to achieve global resolutions of mass tort liti-
gation. Neither the proposed rule adaptations and changes nor
the proposals for new fora deal directly with the factual and
legal complexity of the cases. Nor do they address the conflicts
of interest that inhere in the litigation or the problems related
to future plaintiffs. And they ignore the peculiar risk profile
that drives mass tort litigation. In an effort to reduce transac-
tion costs and expedite settlement, these proposals aim to
rationalize what courts are already doing, while failing to con-
front the difficult ethical and equity issues that are now inex-
tricably intertwined with mass personal injury litigation.
A. Variations Within the Current Rules
1. Consolidation
Under Federal Rule 42(a), judges have experimented with
consolidating larger and larger numbers of cases for trial.
[Vol. 59:961
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Judge Robert Parker, whose more than a decade-long experi-
ence trying asbestos cases has included innumerable attempts
to achieve collective resolutions, attempted an innovative ap-
proach to consolidated trials in the Eastern District of Texas.
In Cimono v. Raymark,371 Judge Parker selected 160 cases to
represent more than 2000 aggregated claims, and tried these
cases in multiple phases to three juries. In Phase I, the initial
jury heard evidence on liability and found in favor of the plain-
tiffs. This jury also determined multipliers to be used in com-
puting punitive damages. In Phase II, two new juries, sitting
together, heard evidence on plaintiffs' exposure to defendants'
products. In Phase III, the same two juries, sitting jointly,
heard evidence on contributory negligence (i.e. smoking) and,
sitting separately, heard damages for two different groups of
claimants. Each of these two groups of claimants comprised
several sub-groups, each of which in turn was composed of
individuals who had been chosen to represent claimants with
different types and degrees of injury. The individuals whose
cases were actually tried to the juries received whatever the
jury awarded in damages (which, in the case of defense ver-
dicts, amounted to zero). Then, the awards for plaintiffs in
each of the sample groups, including zero awards, were aver-
aged and the claimants whose injuries placed them within that
group, but whose cases were not actually tried, were awarded
that average amount."2 Judge Parker's experiment had the
support of plaintiffs' attorneys, but defendants appealed the
unusual arrangement.
The Cimono approach to consolidation addresses one of the
sets of conflicting interests inherent in mass claims. By divid-
ing claimants according to severity of injury, asking juries to
decide representative cases in each severity category and then
allocating damages among categories of claimants based on
average verdicts within each category, the procedure increases
the likelihood that settlement amounts will mirror actual loss-
es, and decreases the likelihood that the value of serious
claims will be diluted by the existence of a large volume of
27 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
2 See also Michael J. Saks & Peter Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecog-
nized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN.
L. REv. 815, 822-23 (1992).
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minor injury claims. By itself, however, this approach cannot
deal with the problem of future claimants; nor does it change
incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to identify as many cases as
possible as soon as possible, without regard to injury severi-
ty.3 73
Cimino was followed by an even more ambitious applica-
tion of this consolidation method. The Baltimore consolidation
of more than 8000 asbestos cases is the largest such trial re-
ported to date37 -- more than six times the size of the consoli-
dated trial of Bendectin cases presided over by Judge Rubin in
the mid-1980s. Leading mass tort practitioners and judges
with prior experience in dealing with such cases evince little
enthusiasm for replicating the experience.
2. Federal-state coordination
Another approach to resolving mass claims that has be-
come increasingly popular in recent years is coordination of
federal and state judges' activities. There are no formal mecha-
nisms for aggregating cases across state and federal jurisdic-
tional boundaries. But, in a recent article, Judge William
Schwarzer and his associates discuss eleven cases-nine of
which involved mass personal injuries-in which federal and
state judges established procedures for coordinating pretrial
activities and engaging in joint settlement efforts.7 5 In three
of these instances, the judges considered, but later abandoned,
the notion of holding joint trialsY.16 The authors' discussion
suggests that the judges' efforts were motivated both by a
desire to reduce transactions costs and to expedite pretrial
activities and by an interest in achieving global settlements.
Federal-state coordination, then, is a logical next step along
the path that judges have trod in dealing with mass personal
... In principle, each case tried to verdict (or represented by a tried case within
its injury severity class) is eligible for punitive damages without regard to severi-
ty, and without regard to the amount of punitive damages previously assessed
against the defendant.
... See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
3" Schwarzer et al., supra note 13, at 1700-07. The authors did not conduct a
comprehensive survey to identify all instances of such coordination; a more exten-
sive search might find that such coordination is more prevalent than generally be-
lieved.
316 Id. at 1700-06.
1054 [Vol. 59:961
UNDERSTANDING MASS LITIGATION
injury claims over the past decade: It aims to achieve more
efficient resolution of mass claims, without addressing the
equity issues that inhere in them.
B. Proposed Revisions to Current Rules
1. Multidistricting
There have been several proposals to change the civil rules
to permit "multidistricting" mass tort claims across federal and
state jurisdictions, and formally to provide for trial, as well as
pretrial management, of the collected claims within the district
to which they are assigned. In 1989, the American Bar Associ-
ation ("ABA") Commission on Mass Torts drafted a recommen-
dation to the ABA House of Delegates for Congressional autho-
rization of federal court jurisdiction for litigation involving 250
or more claims arising out of a single accident or exposure to a
single product or substance. 7 Support for the proposal how-
ever, was deemed so slight that it was withdrawn from consid-
eration before formal debate. For several years, bills have been
considered in the House that would establish federal jurisdic-
tion for mass disaster claims. Under the terms of the Multipar-
ty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1991 (H.R. 2450), introduced
June 1991, federal jurisdiction would be granted whenever
twenty-five or more deaths or injuries result from a single
"accident at a discrete location"-i.e., not including mass prod-
uct injuries or toxic exposure cases-when resulting injuries
each involve losses of $50,000 or more, and when minimal
requirements for diversity are met. Cases would be transferred
to a single jurisdiction, which would retain the cases not only
for pretrial management but also for determination of liability
and punitive damages. Cases would be remanded to their origi-
nal federal district or state court for determination of other
damages, unless the court found that it would serve the conve-
nience of the parties and the interests of justice to retain the
case for such determination. Decisions on choice of law would
be made by the transferee court.37 The bill passed the House
Id. at 1697.
3 Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1991, H.R. REP. No. 2450, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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in the 102d Congress, but did not reach the Senate. Most re-
cently, the American Law Institute ("ALr') has recommended
that Congress replace the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Liti-
gation with a "Complex Litigation Panel." The Panel would
have the authority to transfer to a single jurisdiction (federal
or state) "transactionally related" federal and state cases on
the motion of parties or of federal or state judges, sua sponte,
for pretrial management and disposition, without regard to
diversity. To facilitate consolidation of cases, the ALI proposed
that Congress adopt a uniform federal choice of law code for
complex litigation." '
As suggested by their description, all of these proposals
are intended to facilitate collective resolution of complex litiga-
tion. The ALI proposal-the most ambitious and comprehen-
sive plan put forward to date, meticulously laid-out in two
several-hundred-page volumes-incorporates concerns about
fairness and party autonomy in the standards set forth for
determining the appropriateness of intra and inter-system
consolidation. But it and the other proposals for expanding
multidistricting are more attentive to the mechanics of achiev-
ing consolidation than to the substantive issues and conflicts of
interest that have complicated resolution of mass personal
injury litigation to date.
2. Class actions
There has been a dramatic shift in beliefs about the appro-
priateness of Rule 23 class actions for mass toxic torts since
the Advisory Committee penned its admonition against the use
of the Rule in tort actions in 1966. Although class action certif-
ication was denied by trial courts or vacated by appellate
courts in some asbestos cases,"' the federal Hyatt Skywalk
cases38' and the California Dalkon Shield litigation,382 class
3' COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, § 5.01, supra note 12.
38 See, e.g., In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1990); Yandle v.
PPG Indus., 65 F.R.D. 566 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
381 See, e.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982) (deny-
ing class certificates of plaintiffs in asbestos litigation because they suffered differ-
ent diseases and were exposed to asbestos in different ways and to different de-
grees).
" In re N. Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847
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actions have proceeded in other asbestos cases,8 ' Agent Or-
ange, in some mass disaster cases," in some toxic exposure
cases and in the context of bankruptcy. The Advisory Commit-
tee on Civil Rules has been considering a revision to Rule 23
for some time. A draft circulated for comment in 1993 proposes
eliminating the various subdivisions of the current Rule that
set forth grounds for class action certification and substituting
a provision that permits the court to determine whether class
members may opt out or in to a particular class. An explicit
provision for certification of only some issues in dispute is also
included in the draft revisions.
Although the proposed changes to Rule 23 seem intended,
in part, to facilitate global resolutions of mass torts, unlike the
proposals discussed above, they appear to reflect concerns
about some of the more problematic aspects of such resolu-
tions. An accompanying Note to Rule 26(e) suggests that class
action settlements might be referred to an independent counsel
"as a means of breaking the information monopoly of self-inter-
ested parties," and a reference to "fiduciary duty" in Rule 23
itself is "calculated to emphasize the obligation of representa-
tives and attorneys to put aside self-interest." In his letter
discussing the proposed revisions, the Reporter to the Advisory
Committee asks "would more detailed principles of fiduciary
duty to the class be useful?" and "should the draft provision for
investigation [of a settlement] be expanded to require appoint-
ment of an independent representative for the class to evaluate
any proposed dismissal and settlement?" He also suggests that
"procedures might be drafted to increase the attention given to
[conflicts within a class]."3
(9th Cir. 1982) (vacating trial court's certification of nationwide class of claimants),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
" See, e.g., Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986) (af-
firming trial court's class certification in asbestos litigation and its bifurcation of
punitive and actual damages determination).
' Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977) (certifying class action in
Beverly Hills Supper Club Fire litigation).
" Edward Cooper, Reporter, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Letter to
"Civil Procedure Buffs" (Jan. 21, 1993).
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C. New Fora
1. Special courts
Proposals to enhance courts' ability to collect cases across
state and federal jurisdictional boundaries have met with ob-
jections from judges, practitioners and scholars concerned
about preserving the values of federalism. Some also worry
that there may be a natural tendency to collect mass litigation
in federal courts rather than state courts, leading to overbur-
dening of the federal system. In response to such concerns,
some commentators have suggested establishing a "national
disaster court" devoted exclusively to mass personal injury
claims." 6 But such a court would merely change the venue in
which mass tort litigation would be played out, without signifi-
cantly changing the dynamics of the litigation. Indeed, creation
of a single national disaster court might serve to further con-
centrate mass personal injury litigation in the hands of a very
few law firms, which would seem more likely to exacerbate,
than mitigate, the conflicts of interest inherent in the litiga-
tion.
2. Statutory schemes'
The most radical proposals for resolving mass tort claims
call for substituting statutory administrative compensation
schemes for tort law. These proposals have typically been put
forth as a "solution" to long-lived mass tort litigation, such as
asbestos worker injury litigation. 7 Whatever the merits of
such schemes, they are unlikely to prove politically feasible
because of the public costs involved and because, once litiga-
tion is well-established, the attorneys have such large financial
stakes in continuing the litigation that they are likely to op-
pose legislative alternatives. Moreover, defendants who have
favored such legislative alternatives have not always been
willing to entertain compensation schedules that would provide
reasonable levels of compensation to injury victims and their
families.
" Lancaster & Connors, supra note 14, at 1754.
" See, e.g., Brickman, supra note 15.
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3. Claims Resolution Facilities
Currently, claims resolution facilities designed jointly by
judges, plaintiffs' attorneys and defendants appear to offer the
most promise for resolving mass personal injury litigation,
although the promise has yet to be realized. Such facilities
typically offer a combination of administrative compensation
schedules, alternative dispute resolution, and-in some in-
stances-jury trial, custom-tailored to meet the requirements
of plaintiffs' attorneys and defendants in particular cases.
Because such facilities are sui generis, they necessitate only
negotiating agreements within the narrow confines of a specific
litigation, rather than building a broad-based political constitu-
ency to support a legislative remedy. They offer defendants an
opportunity to reach closure in litigation, and plaintiffs an
opportunity to match procedures and remedies to diffeiing
circumstances. Because they are designed in the course of
litigation, they typically provide compensation to plaintiffs'
attorneys for their investment in the litigation. They also may
be designed to reserve funds for compensating future claim-
ants. And if they are designed under the aegis of the court,
their remedies and procedures should be subject to judicial
review and approval."'8
But claims resolution facilities are not a panacea for mass
tort litigation. Typically, they emerge late in a litigation, often
after the defendants have entered bankruptcy proceedings,
when funds to compensate plaintiffs may have been seriously
depleted. Often they offer levels of compensation to individuals
with pending claims that are far less than the amounts re-
ceived by those who were successful in prior litigation. The
creatures of negotiated settlements, they may pay compensa-
tion without regard to the validity of the underlying claims of
a causal connection between product use or exposure and inju-
ry. They also relieve culpable defendants of the threat of puni-
tive damages. Since each facility is custom-designed by a dif-
ferent set of litigators, they offer none of the economies of scale
that might be offered by a publicly-administered centralized
compensation program. Their reliance on administrative proce-
" On claims resolution facilities, see Francis E. McGovern, Foreword, 53 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Autumn 1990).
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dures-required to minimize transactions costs and expedite
dispositions-denies many, if not all, injured individuals of an
opportunity to have their cases heard and to bring culpable
defendants to account in a public forum. Judges who have
developed a personal stake in resolving litigation may be too
prone to approve whatever remedies and procedural rules are
proposed by the parties in order to achieve closure. In addition,
the history of some claims facilities suggests that, over time,
their administrators and directors may become so concerned
about preserving the facilities' assets that they adopt the role
of recalcitrant defendants vis-a-vis claimants, rather than the
role of neutral administrators implementing a program design
to deliver compensation to injured claimants. And, ultimately,
claims resolution facilities will do little to change the troubling
dynamics of mass personal injury litigation.
CONCLUSION
In the early 1980s, as asbestos filings mounted, some ob-
servers suggested that despite their numbers, they were mere-
ly another example of product liability litigation, which courts
would soon learn to handle efficiently and expeditiously. When
asbestos filings continued to rise at an exponential pace, and
litigation involving mass marketed drugs and medical devices
crowded the dockets, the rhetoric surrounding mass personal
injury litigation became more heated. Defendants saw greedy
plaintiffs' attorneys as solely to blame for the litigation, while
plaintiffs' attorneys and consumer activists pointed to irrespon-
sible and intransigent manufacturers and a flawed regulatory
process.
A review of the history of mass personal injury litigation
over the past two decades reveals a more complex story of the
emergence of the litigation and court efforts to resolve it.
Plaintiff attorneys do play a central role in the story of mass
personal injury litigation, both as advocates of injured parties
and as risk-taking entrepreneurs. Juries and judges have
found repeatedly that manufacturers marketed inadequately
tested or unsafe products, or provided inadequate information
about product risks and benefits. Regulators have often done
too little, too late. But the character of the litigation reflects
the structure of the legal process, including substantive and
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procedural rules and judicial attitudes and behaviors, as much
as it reflects the character of attorneys and defendants. And
the emergence of mass tort litigation owes as much or more to
changes in science and technology, marketing, information
diffusion and cultural attitudes as it does to changes in the
legal system. Perhaps most importantly, mass tort litigation
reflects the fundamental decision of American society to rely
on the civil justice system to compensate individuals for injury
and disease, to deter corporate wrong-doing and to achieve
corrective justice.
If we are to continue to rely on the legal system to achieve
these aims with regard to mass injuries, decisionmakers need
to fashion procedures that provide compensation, in adequate
amounts, to those who are truly injured, when they are in-
jured, and that allocate the bulk of available resources to in-
jured claimants, rather than to attorneys for plaintiffs and
defendants. Decisionmakers need to assume that liability rules
and procedures for applying them that hold manufacturers and
service providers to high safety standards, while also insuring
that beneficial products are developed and remain on the mar-
ket at a reasonable price. Finally, decisionmakers need to
fashion processes that properly align attorneys' and clients'
interests, that provide vehicles for plaintiffs to have a voice in
the resolution of their claims and for non-culpable defendants
to vindicate themselves. Currently, despite considerable efforts
and creativity on the part of judges, attorneys and parties, the
legal system too often fails these tests in its approach to re-
solving mass personal injury litigation.
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Appendix Figure 1
A Profile of Mass Tort Litigation
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APPENDIX FIGURE 2
LAWYER ADVERTISEMENT FOR BREAST IMPLANT CASES
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